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Abstract
In the Hospital Residents problem with lower and upper quotas (HR-QUL ), the goal
is to find a stable matching of residents to hospitals where the number of residents
matched to a hospital is either between its lower and upper quota or zero [Biro´ et al.,
TCS 2010]. We analyze this problem from a parameterized perspective using several
natural parameters such as the number of hospitals and the number of residents.
Moreover, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a stable matching if
it exists on instances with maximum lower quota two. Alongside HR-QU
L
, we also
consider two closely related models of independent interest, namely, the special case
of HR-QUL where each hospital has only a lower quota but no upper quota and the
variation of HR-QU
L
where hospitals do not have preferences over residents, which is
also known as the House Allocation problem with lower and upper quotas.
1 Introduction
Since its introduction by Gale and Shapely [13], the Hospital Residents problem, which
is also known as the College Admission problem, has attracted a lot of attention. Besides
a rich body of theoretical work [21], also many practical applications have been identi-
fied [30]. Applications include various centralized assignment problems, for example, in
the context of education [1, 9, 31] or in the context of assigning career starters to their
first work place [10, 28]. In the classical Hospital Residents problem (HR-QU), we are
given a set of residents, each with strict preferences over hospitals, and a set of hospitals,
each with an upper quota and strict preferences over residents. In a feasible matching of
residents to hospitals, the number of residents that are assigned to a hospital is at most
its upper quota. A hospital-resident pair (h, r) blocks a matching if resident r prefers
hospital h to the hospital to which r is currently matched and the number of residents
matched to h is either below its upper quota or h prefers r to one of the residents matched
to it. The task in the Hospital Residents problem is to find a stable matching, i.e., a fea-
sible matching that does not admit a blocking pair. Gale and Shapely [13] presented a
linear-time algorithm that always finds a stable matching in a Hospital Residents instance.
In practice, some hospitals may also have a lower quota, i.e., a minimum number of
assigned residents such that the hospital can open and accommodate them. For exam-
ple, due to economical or political reasons, a university might have a lower quota on the
number of students for each course of study. Moreover, practical considerations might
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impose lower quotas, for instance, if all residents assigned to a hospital need to perform
certain tasks together which require at least a given number of participating residents.
Biro´ et al. [7] captured these considerations by extending the Hospital Residents problem
such that each hospital has a lower and upper quota (HR-QU
L
). Here, feasibility addition-
ally requires that the number of residents assigned to a hospital is either zero or at least
its lower quota, while stability additionally requires that there does not exist a blocking
coalition, i.e., a sufficiently large subset of residents that want to open a currently closed
hospital together. Biro´ et al. [7] proved that deciding the existence of a stable match-
ing in an HR-QU
L
instance is NP-complete. We complement their work with a thorough
parameterized complexity analysis of HR-QU
L
and closely related problems, considering
various problem-specific parameters. Moreover, we study the Hospital Residents problem
where hospitals have only a lower quota (HR-QL), which has not been considered before.
Lower and upper quotas have also been applied to the House Allocation problem (HA-
QU
L
) where the goal is to match a set of applicants to a set of houses [11, 17, 25]. In HA-QU
L
,
houses have a lower and upper quota but no preferences over applicants, while applicants
have preferences over houses. One possible application of this model is the assignment of
kids to different activities, where lower quotas could arise due to economical or practical
constraints, for instance, playing soccer with only three kids is less fun. So far, literature
on HA-QU
L
mainly focused on finding Pareto optimal matchings. However, in contrast
to the classical House Allocation problem, Pareto optimality in HA-QU
L
does not imply
stability. Thus, finding stable matchings is an interesting problem on its own.
Our contributions. We provide an extensive complexity analysis of the Hospital Res-
idents problem with lower and upper quotas (HR-QU
L
) and of the two closely related
problems HR-QL and HA-Q
U
L
. By applying the framework of parameterized complexity,
we analyze the influence of various problem-specific parameters on the complexity of these
problems, i.e., the maximum lower quota ql of a hospital, the number n of residents, the
number m of hospitals, and the number mquota of hospitals with non-unit lower quota.
Motivated by the observation that there might exist stable matchings opening a different
set of hospitals (of possibly different size) [7], we also consider the problem of deciding
whether there exists a stable matching where exactly a given set of hospitals Hopen is
open and the problem of deciding whether there exists a stable matching with exactly
mopen (mclosed) open (closed) hospitals parameterized by mopen (mclosed).
We present an overview of our results in Table 1. Our most important technical con-
tribution is the design of a polynomial-time algorithm for HR-QU
L
(and therefore also for
HR-QL) instances where all hospitals have lower quota at most two. This answers an open
question raised by Biro´ et al. [7] and by Manlove [21, p. 231]. Such HR-QU
L
instances are
of special theoretical interest, as they, for example, subsume a variant of three-dimensional
Stable Marriage, where, given two sets of agents each with preferences over the agents
from the other set, the goal is to find a stable set of triples, each consisting of two agents
from the first and one agent from the second set. Moreover, there also exist several ap-
plications where a lower quota of two is of particular interest, for example, assuming that
hospitals correspond to (tennis) coaches and residents to (tennis) players, a coach may
require that at least two players are assigned to her (as she does not always want to play
herself).
Our rich set of tractability and intractability results allows us to draw several high-
level conclusions about the considered problems. First, our results highlight the differences
between the three considered models from a computational perspective: While HR-QL is
very similar to HR-QU
L
, HA-QU
L
is computationally more demanding than HR-QU
L
. The
2
.ql ≤ 2 ql ≤ 3 Hopen n m mquota mopen mclosed
HR-QU
L
P (T. 4)
NP-c.
(T. 1)
P (P. 1)
W[1]-h.
(T. 2)
FPT (C. 1)
W[1]-h.
(C. 3)
W[1]-h.
(P. 4)
HR-QL P (O. 2)
HA-QU
L NP-c.
(P. 3)
NP-c.
(T. 3)
FPT
(P. 2)
paraNP-h.
(P. 3)
paraNP-h.
(C. 2)
W[1]-h.
(C. 2)
Table 1: Overview of our results. All stated W[1]-hardness results also imply NP-hardness.
With the exception of the parameter mclosed for HA-Q
U
L
, we present XP algorithms for
all W[1]-hard cases. Note that most hardness results even hold in cases where the quota
of hospitals and the maximum length of a preference list are small constants.
first observation suggests that the complexity of HR-QU
L
comes solely from the lower
quotas of hospitals. The second observation indicates that the hospitals’ preferences in
the lower and upper quotas setting make the problem easier, as they may act as a “tie-
breaker” to decide which resident deserves a better spot in a stable matching.
Second, our results identify the “difficult parts” of the considered problems. Consid-
ering that for HR-QL and HR-Q
U
L
, we can decide in polynomial time whether there exists
a stable matching opening exactly a given set of hospitals, the complexity of HR-QL and
HR-QU
L
comes purely from deciding which hospitals are open and not from the task of
assigning residents to hospitals. This finding is strengthened by the observation that most
of our hardness reductions also work if we ignore blocking pairs, i.e., for the problem of
assigning residents to hospitals such that the lower quota of each hospital is respected
and no blocking coalition of residents to open a closed hospital exists.
Third, our results identify the fine line between tractability and intractability. For
example, parameterizing the three problems by the number of hospitals leads to fixed-
parameter tractability, while only considering the number of open or closed hospitals in a
stable matching as a parameter results in W[1]-hardness. A similar contrast arises when
considering the influence of the total number of hospitals and the number of hospitals
with non-unit lower quota on HA-QU
L
.
Related Work. After the work of Biro´ et al. [7], only few papers revisited computa-
tional problems related to the Hospital Residents problem with lower and upper quotas.
A notable exception is the work of Agoston et al. [2] who proposed an ILP formulation
to find stable matchings and several preprocessing rules to decide which hospitals must
be open in a stable matching. Apart from this, most of the follow-up work applied the
idea of lower and upper quotas to other settings, such as the House Allocation prob-
lem [11, 17, 25] or maximum-weight many-to-one matchings in bipartite graphs [3], or
interpreted it differently.
Hamada et al. [15] introduced an alternative version of the Hospital Residents prob-
lem with lower and upper quotas. In their model, hospitals have lower and upper quotas,
but are not allowed to be closed. Thus, in a feasible matching, the lower and upper
quota of each hospital needs to be respected. As deciding whether a stable matching
exists is polynomial-time solvable in this model, their main focus lied on finding a fea-
sible matching minimizing the number of blocking pairs. Mnich et al. [24] studied the
Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints problem, which corresponds to the
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special case of Hamada et al.’s model where each hospital has unit upper quota, from a
parameterized perspective considering parameters such as the number of blocking pairs
and the number of hospitals with non-zero lower quota. To capture stable matching
problems with diversity or distributional constraints, the model of Hamada et al. [15] has
been adapted and further developed in various directions, for example, by assuming that
residents belong to different types and each hospital has type-specific lower and upper
quotas [4, 12, 19].
Another popular stable matching problem is the Hospital Residents problem with
couples (HRC) [8, 23], where some of the residents are grouped in pairs and submit their
preferences together. The HR-QU
L
problem where all hospitals have upper quota at most
two is closely related to the special case of HRC where all hospitals have upper quota one:
Switching the roles of residents and hospitals and interpreting couples as hospitals with
lower quota two, the only difference between the two problems is that the preferences of
couples are over pairs of hospitals, while the preferences of quota-two hospitals are over
single residents.
From a technical perspective, our work falls in line with previous work on the param-
eterized complexity of stable matching problems [22, 23, 24].
2 Preliminaries
We consider different models of stable bipartite many-to-one matchings. For the sake of
readability, we refer to all of them as different variants of the Hospital Residents problem
with lower and upper quotas (HR-QU
L
). In HR-QU
L
, we are given a set R = {r1, . . . rn} of
residents and a set H = {h1, . . . , hm} of hospitals, each with a lower and upper quota.
Throughout the paper, n denotes the number of residents and m the number of hospitals.
We refer to the joint set of residents and hospitals as agents. Each resident r ∈ R
accepts a subset of hospitals A(r) ⊆ H and each hospital h ∈ H accepts a subset of
residents A(h) ⊆ R. Each agent a ∈ R ∪ H has a preference list in which all agents
from A(a) are ranked in strict order. For three agents a, a1, and a2, we say that a
prefers a1 to a2 and write a1 ≻a a2 if a1, a2 ∈ A(a) and a ranks a1 above a2.
A matching M is a subset of R×H where each resident is contained in at most one pair
and for each pair (r, h) ∈M , agents r and h accept each other. For a matching M and a
resident r ∈ R, we denote byM(r) the hospital to which r is matched to inM , i.e.,M(r) =
h if (r, h) ∈ M , and we set M(r) :=  if r is not assigned. All residents r prefer each
hospital h ∈ A(r) to being unmatched, i.e., M(r) = . Further, for a hospital h ∈ H, we
denote by M(h) the set of residents that are matched to h, i.e., r ∈ M(h) if (r, h) ∈ M .
We sometimes write M as a set of pairs of the form (h, {r1, . . . , rk}) which denotes that
the residents r1, . . . , rk are matched to hospital h in M .
In HR-QU
L
, each hospital h ∈ H has an upper quota u(h) and a lower quota l(h)
with 1 ≤ l(h) ≤ u(h). We call a matching M feasible if, for all hospitals h ∈ H, it
either holds that |M(h)| = 0 or l(h) ≤ |M(h)| ≤ u(h). We say that a hospital h ∈ H
is closed in M if |M(h)| = 0 and we say that it is open otherwise. Moreover, we call an
open hospital h ∈ H full if |M(h)| = u(h) and an open hospital h ∈ H undersubscribed
if |M(h)| < u(h). In a matching M , a hospital-resident pair (r, h) ∈ R ×H is a blocking
pair if h is open inM , both r and h find each other acceptable, r prefers h to M(r), and h
is either undersubscribed or prefers r to at least one resident fromM(h). Moreover, we call
(h, {r1, . . . , rk}) with k = l(h) a blocking coalition if h is closed in M and, for all i ∈ [k],
resident ri prefers h toM(ri). In this case, we also write that {r1, . . . , rk} forms a blocking
coalition to open h. A feasible matching is called stable if it neither admits a blocking
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pair nor a blocking coalition.
We now describe how the other two models considered in this paper can be formulated
as variants of HR-QU
L
.
House Allocation problem with lower and upper quotas. HA-QU
L
corresponds to HR-QU
L
with one-sided preferences, i.e., all hospitals are indifferent among all residents and resi-
dents have strict preferences over hospitals. While the definition of a blocking coalition
still applies in this setting, a hospital-resident pair (r, h) ∈ R×H is only blocking if h is
open in M , r accepts h, r prefers h to M(r), and h is undersubscribed. Note that HR-QU
L
does not subsume HA-QU
L
, as, in HR-QU
L
, no ties in the preferences are allowed.
Hospital Residents problem with lower quotas. HR-QL is the special case of HR-Q
U
L
where
each hospital has upper quota n + 1. Thereby, no hospital can be full in a matching.
Consequently, in a matchingM , a resident r forms a blocking pair with each hospital h she
prefers to M(r). Thus, in every stable matching, all residents need to be matched to their
most preferred open hospital. This in turn implies that the preferences of hospitals over
residents can be omitted, as they have no influence on the stability of a matching. Hence,
HR-QL is equivalent to the House Allocation problem with lower quotas (= HA-QL) and
thus lies in the “intersection” of HR-QU
L
and HA-QU
L
.
First observations. As already observed, HR-QL instances can be expressed both
as HR-QU
L
and HA-QU
L
instances. Notably, most instances constructed in our reductions
fulfill an additional property which directly transfers the hardness results to a variant
of HR-QL where only blocking coalitions may make a matching unstable.
Observation 1. In HR-QL instances where for each hospital h ∈ H, the number of
residents accepting h is equal to its lower quota l(h), no blocking pairs can exist, while
blocking coalitions can still exist.
Unfortunately, a stable matching may fail to exist in HR-QL instances (and therefore
also in HR-QU
L
and HA-QU
L
instances), even if all hospitals have lower quota at most two.
Consider as an example a HR-QL instance consisting of three hospitals h1, h2, and h3
each with lower quota two and three residents with the following preferences r1 : h1 ≻ h2;
r2 : h2 ≻ h3; r3 : h3 ≻ h1. Note that this example resembles the Condorcet paradox. In
the following hardness reductions, we will frequently use this construction as a penalizing
component to ensure that certain residents are matched to some designated set of hospitals
in a stable matching.
Moreover, for all three models, there might exist stable matchings with a different
number of open/closed hospitals. Consider an HR-QL instance consisting of one hos-
pital h1 with lower quota one, one hospital h2 with lower quota two, and one hospi-
tal h3 with lower quota three together with three residents with the following prefer-
ences: r1 : h3 ≻ h1; r2 : h2 ≻ h3; r3 : h3 ≻ h2. This instance admits two stable
matchings M1 = {(h3, {r1, r2, r3})} and M2 = {(h1, {r1}), (h2, {r2, r3})} where the sets of
opened hospitals have different sizes.
3 Parameterized Complexity
In this section, we analyze the parameterized computational complexity of HR-QL,
HR-QU
L
, and HA-QU
L
. We start by proving that all three problems are NP-complete. Then,
we consider the influence of several problem-specific parameters including the number of
residents and several parameters related to the number of hospitals.
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3.1 An NP-Completeness Result
Biro´ et al. [7] proved that HR-QU
L
is NP-complete, even if each hospital has upper quota
at most three. However, their reduction does not settle the computational complexity
of HR-QL or HA-Q
U
L
. To answer this question, note that all three models subsume
hedonic games (see [5] for definitions): We introduce a resident for each agent in the given
hedonic game and a hospital for each possible coalition with lower quota equal to the size
of the coalition. We replace the coalitions in the agents’ preferences by the corresponding
hospitals. Core stable outcomes in the hedonic game then correspond to stable matchings
in the constructed HR-QL instance, which notably falls under Observation 1. As deciding
the existence of a core stable outcome is NP-complete, even if all coalitions have size three
[26], this implies that all three problems are NP-complete, even if each hospital has lower
quota (and upper quota) at most three. By slightly adopting the reduction from [26],
one can also bound the number of residents acceptable to a hospital and the number of
hospitals acceptable to a resident. For illustrative purposes, we present an alternative
reduction from 3-Satisfiability.
Theorem 1. HR-QL, HR-Q
U
L
, and HA-QU
L
are NP-complete, even if each resident accepts
at most four hospitals, each hospital accepts at most three residents, and the lower (and
upper) quota of every hospital is at most three.
Proof. We reduce from the NP-hard variant of Satisfiability where each clause contains
exactly three literals and each variable occurs exactly twice positively and twice negatively
[6]. An instance of Satisfiabilit consists of a variable set X = {x1, . . . xq} and set of
clauses C = {c1, . . . cp}. For each i ∈ [q], we denote as c
pos
i,1 and c
pos
i,2 the two clauses
where variable xi appears positively and as c
neg
i,1 and c
neg
i,2 the two clauses where variable
xi appears negatively. From this, we construct an instance of HR-QL that falls under
Observation 1 and thereby also prove the theorem for the other two models.
Construction: For each i ∈ [q], we introduce two hospitals hi and hi with lower
quota three and two hospitals h∗i and h
∗
i with lower quota two. Moreover, we add three
hospitals h1i , h
2
i , and h
3
i with lower quota two that will help us to build a penalizing
component. Finally, we create one hospital hc for each clause c ∈ C with lower quota
three.
Turning to the residents, for each i ∈ [q], we add two variable residents (ri and ri), two
dummy residents (d1i and d
2
i ), and three penalizing residents (p
∗
i , p
1
i , p
2
i ). The assignment
of the variable residents encode the truth assignments and their preferences are as follows:
ri : hi ≻ hcpos
i,1
≻ hcpos
i,2
≻ h∗i ri : hi ≻ hcneg
i,1
≻ hcneg
i,2
≻ h
∗
i .
The two dummy residents enable us to choose for each i ∈ [q] which of the two hospitals hi
and hi should be open and thereby which of the two residents ri and ri are matched to
her top-choice. The preferences of the dummy residents are as follows:
d1i : hi ≻ hi d
2
i : hi ≻ hi.
Lastly, we construct a penalizing component for each variable i ∈ [q] consisting of three
agents whose preferences are as follows:
p∗i : h
∗
i ≻ h
∗
i ≻ h
1
i ≻ h
2
i , p
1
i : h
2
i ≻ h
3
i , p
2
i : h
3
i ≻ h
1
i .
Note that if p∗i is not matched to h
∗
i or h
∗
i , then no stable matching of these three residents
p∗i , p
1
i , and p
2
i to their acceptable hospitals h
1
i , h
2
i , and h
3
i exists. Note that in the
6
constructed instance, for all hospitals, the number of residents accepting it is equal to
its lower quota. We now prove that the given propositional formula has a satisfying
assignment if and only if there exists a stable matching in the constructed HR-QL instance.
(⇒) Let Z be the set of variables that are set to true in a satisfying assignment of the
given propositional formula. From this we construct a stable matching M :
{(hi, {ri, d
1
i , d
2
i }), (h
∗
i , {ri, p
∗
i }) | xi ∈ Z} ∪ {(hi, {ri, d
1
i , d
2
i }), (h
∗
i , {ri, p
∗
i }) | xi /∈ Z}
∪ {(h3i , {p
1
i , p
2
i }) | i ∈ [q]}.
As the constructed instance falls under Observation 1, no blocking pair exists. We now
iterate over all closed hospitals and argue why there cannot exist a blocking coalition to
open this hospital. For each i ∈ [q], one of hi and hi is closed. However, as one of the
three residents (either d1i or d
2
i ) that find such a hospital acceptable is matched to her
top-choice in M , no blocking coalition to open it can exist. Moreover, for each i ∈ [q],
one of h∗i and h
∗
i is closed. However, as one of the two residents (either ri or ri) that find
such a hospital acceptable is matched to her top-choice in M , no blocking coalition to
open it can exist. In addition, all clause hospitals hc for c ∈ C are closed. However, as Z
induces a satisfying assignment, it needs to hold that for at least one literal occurring
in c, the corresponding resident is matched to its top-choice. Finally, there does not exist
a blocking coalition to open h1i and h
2
i , as both or one of the two residents that find one
of these hospitals acceptable are matched better in M .
(⇐) Assume that there exists a stable matching M of residents to hospitals. First of all,
note that all residents p∗i need to be matched to h
∗
i or h
∗
i , as otherwise no stable matching
of the residents p∗i , p
1
i , and p
2
i to the remaining acceptable hospitals h
1
i , h
2
i , and h
3
i can
exist (see also Section 2). Consequently, for each i ∈ [q], either h∗i or h
∗
i needs to be
open and at least one of the residents ri and ri needs to be matched to one of the two.
Moreover, no clause hospital can be open in a stable matching: Let us assume that some
clause hospital is open and, without loss of generality, some resident ri is matched to
it. Then, as argued above, ri needs to be assigned to h
∗
i . However, such an assignment
is blocked by the two unassigned dummy residents d1i and d
2
i and ri to open ri’s top-
choice hi. Thus, for each i ∈ [q], either ri is matched to hi and ri is matched to h
∗
i , or ri
is matched to h∗i and ri is matched to hi.
Let Z = {xi ∈ X |M(ri) 6= h
∗
i }. We claim that setting all variables in Z to true and all
others to false induces a satisfying assignment of the given propositional formula. For the
sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists a clause c = {ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3} ∈ C which is
not fulfilled. However, this implies that all three corresponding variable residents are all
matched to their least preferred acceptable hospital. From this is follows that M cannot
be stable, as these three variable residents then form a blocking coalition to open hc.
3.2 Parameterization by Number of Residents
After establishing the NP-hardness of all three problems, we now analyze their com-
putational complexity parameterized by the number of residents. While there exists a
straightforward XP algorithm for this parameter that guesses for each resident the hos-
pital she is assigned to, all three problems are W[1]-hard.
Theorem 2. Parameterized by the number n of residents, HR-QL, HR-Q
U
L
, and HA-QU
L
are W[1]-hard, even if every hospital has lower (and upper) quota at most four and accepts
at most four residents.
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Proof. We prove hardness by a parameterized reduction from Multicolored Inde-
pendent Set. In an instance of Multicolored Independent Set, we are given an
undirected graph G = (V = {v1, . . . , vn}, E) together with a partition V1, · · · , Vk of V
into k different colors and the question is whether there exists an independent set of size k
containing exactly one vertex from each color, i.e., a subset V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| = k and
|V ′ ∩ Vi| = 1 for all i ∈ [k] such that no two vertices in V
′ are adjacent. Multicol-
ored Independent Set parameterized by k is W[1]-hard [27]. It is easy to see that
the problem remains W[1]-hard if we assume that there exist some (arbitrary) integers p
and q such that each vertex v is adjacent to exactly p vertices, and each color c ∈ [k]
contains exactly q vertices. To simplify notation, we reduce from this restricted version.
For each vertex v, let uv1, . . . , u
v
p be a list of all vertices incident to v. For a vertex v ∈ V
and an integer i ∈ [p], we write z(v, i) to denote the i-th vertex that is incident to v, i.e.,
z(v, i) = uvi . Moreover, for each color c ∈ [k], let v
c
1, . . . , v
c
q a list of all vertices with this
color. From an instance of Multicolored Independent Set, we now construct an
instance of HR-QL that falls under Observation 1 and thereby also prove the theorem for
the other two models.
Construction: For each vertex v ∈ V , we introduce a vertex hospital hv with lower
quota three. Moreover, for each edge {v, v′} ∈ V , we introduce an edge hospital h{v,v′}
with lower quota four. Furthermore, we introduce for each color c ∈ [k] a penalizing
component consisting of three penalizing hospitals hc1, h
c
2, and h
c
3 with lower quota two.
Turning to the residents, we introduce for each color c ∈ [k] two color residents r1c
and r2c . One of the color residents ranks the vertex hospitals corresponding to vertices
of color c in some ordering and the other color resident ranks them in reversed order.
Both residents rank directly in front of each vertex hospital all edge hospitals involving
the corresponding vertex in an arbitrary order. That is:
r1c : h{vc1,z(vc1,1)} ≻ · · · ≻ h{vc1,z(vc1,p)} ≻ hv
c
1
≻ · · · ≻ h{vcq ,z(vcq ,1)} ≻ · · · ≻ h{vcq ,z(vcq ,p)} ≻ hvcq
r2c : h{vcq ,z(vcq ,1)} ≻ · · · ≻ h{vcq ,z(vcq ,p)} ≻ hvcq ≻ · · · ≻ h{vc1,z(vc1,1)} ≻ · · · ≻ h{vc1,z(vc1,p)} ≻ hv
c
1
Moreover, for each color c ∈ [k], we introduce a penalizing component consisting of three
penalizing residents p∗c , p
1
c , p
2
c :
p∗c : hvc1 ≻ · · · ≻ hvcq ≻ h
1
c ≻ h
2
c p
1
c : h
2
c ≻ h
3
c p
2
c : h
3
c ≻ h
1
c .
The penalizing component enforces that for each color at least (and, in fact, exactly one)
hospital needs to be open. The preferences of the color residents are constructed in a way
such that no two hospitals that correspond to adjacent vertices can be open. Note that for
each constructed hospital, the number of residents accepting it is equal its lower quota.
We now prove that there exists a solution to the given Multicolored Independent
Set instance if and only if there exists a stable matching in the constructed HR-QL
instance.
(⇒) Assume that V ′ = {vi1 , . . . , vik} is an independent set in G with vic ∈ Vc for
all c ∈ [k]. From this we construct a stable matching M as follows:
M = {(hvic , {r
1
c , r
2
c , p
∗
c}), (h
3
c , {p
1
c , p
2
c}) | c ∈ [k]}.
As the constructed instance falls under Observation 1, no blocking pair can exist. It
remains to argue that for no closed hospital h there exists a coalition of residents to open
it in M . Note that there does not exist a coalition to open h1c or h
2
c for any c ∈ [k], as p
∗
c
is matched to a hospital she prefers to both h1c and h
2
c . Note further that for each color
8
c ∈ [k], the only hospitals that both r1c and r
2
c prefer to the hospital hvic , which is the
hospital they are matched to in M , are the edge hospitals h{vic ,z(vic ,1)}, . . . , h{vic ,z(vic ,p)}
corresponding to vic and the vertices that are adjacent to vic . Hence, as no two color
residents prefer the same vertex hospital, there cannot exist a blocking coalition to open
a vertex hospital. Moreover, as V ′ is an independent set, there do not exist two adjacent
vertices in V ′ and thereby also no edge hospital corresponding to a vertex pair from V ′.
Thus, there does not exist an edge hospital that is preferred by four color residents to the
hospital they are matched to in M . Thus, M is stable.
(⇐) Assume that there exists a stable matching M in the construed HR-QL instance.
First of all note that, for each color c ∈ [k], resident p∗c needs to be matched to a vertex
hospital in M , as otherwise there does not exist a stable matching of the residents p∗c , p
c
1,
and pc2 to the hospitals h
1
c , h
2
c , and h
3
c . Thus, for each color c ∈ [k], there exists exactly
one vertex vic ∈ Vc such that the hospital hvic is open in M . We claim that V
′ = {vic |
c ∈ [k]∧ hvic is open in M} forms an independent set in G. For the sake of contradiction,
let us assume that there exists a pair of vertices v, v′ ∈ V ′ with v ∈ Vc1 and v
′ ∈ Vc2 for
two c1 6= c2 ∈ [k] that are adjacent. By construction, r
1
c1
and r2
c1
are matched to hv and
r1
c2
and r2
c2
are matched to hv′ in M . However, as v and v
′ are adjacent, this implies that
all four residents r1
c1
, r2
c1
, r1
c2
, and r2
c2
prefer the edge hospital h{v,v′} to the hospital they
are matched to in M , which contradicts our assumption that M is a stable matching.
Compared to Theorem 1, the hardness statement from Theorem 2 does not bound the
number of hospitals accepted by each resident. In fact, combining these two parameters,
all three problems become fixed-parameter tractable, as the size of the instance (ignoring
hospitals which no resident accepts) can be bounded in a function of the two parameters.
3.3 Influence of Hospitals
After studying the parameterization by the number of residents, we turn to the number
of hospitals and several closely related parameters. We start by considering the problem
of finding a stable matching opening exactly a given set of hospitals.
3.3.1 Which hospitals should be open?
It is possible to think of finding a stable matching as a two-step process. First, decide
which hospitals are open and second, compute a stable matching between the residents
and the selected set of open hospitals respecting all quotas. This observation leads to the
question what happens if the first step has been already done, e.g., by an oracle or by
some authority, and we are left with the task of finding a stable matching where exactly
a given set of hospitals is open. We show that while for HR-QL and HR-Q
U
L
this problem
is solvable in polynomial-time, it is NP-hard for HA-QU
L
.
As already observed in Section 2, in an HR-QL instance (H,R), all residents are
assigned to their most preferred open hospital in a stable matching. Thereby, checking
whether there exists a stable matching where exactly a given set Hopen ⊆ H of hospitals
is open reduces to assigning each resident to her most preferred hospital in Hopen and
checking whether the resulting matching is stable in (H,R).
Observation 2. Given a subset of hospitals Hopen ⊆ H, deciding whether there exists a
stable matching in an HR-QL instance (H,R) in which exactly the hospitals from Hopen
are open is solvable in O(nm) time.
For HR-QU
L
, a slightly more involved reasoning is needed, which utilizes the famous
Rural Hospitals Theorem [28, 29]:
9
Proposition 1. Given a subset of hospitals Hopen ⊆ H, deciding whether there exists a
stable matching in an HR-QU
L
instance (H,R) in which exactly the hospitals from Hopen
are open is solvable in O(nm) time.
Proof. Given an HR-QU
L
instance (H,R), we calculate the resident-optimal stable match-
ing M of the residents R to the hospitals Hopen ignoring their lower quota by applying
the Gale and Shapely algorithm. We return YES if M is stable in (H,R) and obeys
the quotas and otherwise NO. If the algorithm returns YES, then this answer is clearly
correct, so it remains to show that if there exists a stable matching, then the algorithm
returns YES. Assume that there exists a stable matching M ′ in (H,R) that opens exactly
the hospitals Hopen, and let M be the computed matching. As M
′ is a stable matching
that opens all hospitals from Hopen, matching M
′ is also a stable matching in the instance
(Hopen, R) without lower quotas. By the Rural Hospitals Theorem, it follows that every
stable matching in (Hopen, R)—and therefore also M—matches the same number of resi-
dents as M ′ to each hospital and thus is feasible. Matching M does not admit a blocking
pair by the definition of M . Lastly, due to the resident-optimality of M , it follows that
any blocking coalition for M is also a blocking coalition for M ′.
In sharp contrast to the preceding two positive results for HR-QL and HR-Q
U
L
, HA-QU
L
remains NP-complete even if we know which hospitals are open in a stable matching.
Theorem 3. Given a subset of hospitals Hopen ⊆ H, deciding whether there exists a
stable matching in an HA-QU
L
instance (H,R) in which exactly the hospitals from Hopen
are open is NP-complete, even if Hopen has size four, each resident accepts at most five
hospitals, all hospitals have lower quota at most two, and we know that if there exists a
stable matching, then it opens exactly the hospitals from Hopen.
Proof. We reduce from the NP-hard Independent Set problem on 3-regular graphs, that
is, graphs were all vertices have exactly three neighbors [14]. Given such an instance, we
construct an instance of HA-QU
L
as follows.
Construction: Let (G = (V,E), k) be an instance of Independent Set. For each v ∈
V , let ev1, e
v
2, and e
v
3 be a list of all edges incident to v. We introduce a good hospital h
+
with lower quota zero and upper quota n − k and a bad hospital h− with lower quota
zero and upper quota k. Moreover, we introduce for each edge e an edge hospital he with
lower and upper quota two.
Turning to the residents, we introduce for each vertex v ∈ V a vertex resident rv with
the following preferences:
rv : h
+ ≻ hev1 ≻ hev2 ≻ hev3 ≻ h
−.
Finally, we introduce a penalizing component consisting of three hospitals h1, h2, h3, each
with lower and upper quota two, and four residents r∗, r1, r2, and r3:
r∗ : h− ≻ h1 r1 : h1 ≻ h2 r2 : h2 ≻ h3 r3 : h3 ≻ h1.
We set Hopen := {h
+, h−, h1, h3}. Intuitively, the vertex residents assigned to the bad hos-
pital in a stable matching form an independent set, as two vertex residents corresponding
to adjacent vertices would form a blocking coalition to open the respective edge hospital
together. We now prove that there exists an indpendent set V ′ of size k in the given
graph G if and only if the constructed HA-QU
L
instance admits a stable matching opening
exactly the hospitals from Hopen.
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(⇒) Let V ′ ⊆ V be an independent set of size k in the given graph G. From this, we
construct a stable matching M opening Hopen in the constructed instance by assigning
all vertex residents corresponding to vertices in V ′ to the bad hospital, all other vertex
residents to the good hospital, (h1, {r
∗, r1}), and (h3, {r2, r3}). As no hospital is un-
dersubscribed, it remains to argue why, for no closed hospital, there exists a blocking
coalition to open it: As r1 is matched to her top-choice, there does not exist a blocking
coalition to open h2. Moreover, for no edge, are both residents corresponding to the two
endpoints matched to the bad hospital h−, as V ′ is an independent set. Thus, no blocking
coalition to open an edge hospital can exist.
(⇐) Let M be a stable matching in the constructed instance. First of all note that r∗
needs to be matched to h1, as otherwise r1, r2, and r3 cannot be assigned to the hos-
pitals h1, h2, and h3 in a stable way. This implies that k vertex residents need to be
matched to the bad hospital h−, implying that the remaining n − k vertex residents are
matched to the good hospital h+. Thus, all edge hospitals are closed, since the residents
which accept them need to be either matched to the good or bad hospital as discussed
above. The k vertices {v1, . . . , vk} corresponding to the residents matched to h
− in M
form an independent set, as otherwise a pair of vertex residents rv and rv′ with {v, v
′} ∈ E
forms a blocking coalition to open h{v,v′} in M .
Note that this reduction can be easily adapted to yield NP-completeness for HA-QU
L
restricted to instances with upper quota at most two by splitting the hospitals h+ and h−
into multiple hospitals with upper and lower quota one. However, in this case, the bounds
on the size of Hopen and the number of hospitals acceptable to a single resident do not
hold any more.
3.3.2 Parameterization by the number of hospitals (with non-unit lower
quota).
Together with the number n of residents, the number m of hospitals is a very important
and straightforward structural parameter of the studied problems. Notably, for most
applications, this parameter is much smaller than the number of residents, so checking
for fixed-parameter tractability is of special interest here.
For both HR-QL and HR-Q
U
L
, it is possible to iterate over all possible subsets of
hospitals Hopen ⊆ H and use Observation 2 and Proposition 1, respectively, to decide
whether there exists a stable matching in which exactly the hospitals from Hopen are
open. Let Hquota ⊆ H denote the set of hospitals with non-unit lower quota. In fact, it
is only necessary to iterate over all possible subsets Hopen ⊆ H
quota with non-unit lower
quota. Subsequently, we can add all hospitals with lower quota one to Hopen and apply
again the procedures described in Observation 2 and Proposition 1 to compute a matching
which we then check for stability and feasibility.
Corollary 1. HR-QL and HR-Q
U
L
are solvable in O(nm · 2mquota) time, where mquota is
the number of hospitals with non-unit lower quota.
Turning to HA-QU
L
, despite the fact that it is NP-complete to decide whether there
exists a stable matching even if the set of open hospitals is given, HA-QU
L
parameterized
by the number m of hospitals turns out to be fixed-parameter tractable. The algorithm
utilizes that the number of different resident types in a HA-QU
L
instance can be bounded in
a function of m, as a resident is fully characterized by her preferences over hospitals. This
observation can be used to construct an ILP where the number of variables is bounded
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in a function of m. Employing Lenstra’s algorithm [18, 20] shows that the problem is
fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the number of hospitals.
Proposition 2. Parameterized by the number of hospitals, HA-QU
L
is fixed-parameter
tractable.
Proof. Note that as hospitals are indifferent among all residents, a resident is fully char-
acterized by her preferences over hospitals. Thereby, the number of resident types is
bounded by the number of ordered subsets of m elements which lies in O(m!). Let t1, . . . ,
tq be a list of all resident types. For two hospitals h and h
′, we write h ≻ti h
′ if residents
of type ti prefer h to h
′. For each i ∈ [q], let ni denote the number of residents in the
given instance of type ti. We solve the problem by calculating for each hospital h ∈ H,
and for each i ∈ [q] the number of residents of type ti assigned to hospital h. To denote
this, we introduce a variable xi,h. Moreover, for each hospital h ∈ H, we introduce a
binary variable oh which is one if h is open and zero otherwise. Furthermore, to prevent
blocking pairs, we also need an additional binary variable yh for any hospital h. In the
following, abusing notation, for a resident type ti, we also write h ≻ti h
′ if h′ /∈ A(ti) and
h ∈ A(ti). Using this notation, the problem can be solved using the following ILP:∑
i′∈[q]
xi′,h + yhn ≥ ohu(h),
∑
h′∈H
h′≻tih
xi,h′ + (1− yh)n ≥ ni, ∀i ∈ [q], h ∈ A(ti) (1)
∑
i∈[q],h′∈H:
h≻tih
′
xi,h′ ≤ l(h) + ohn, ∀h ∈ H (2)
ohl(h) ≤
∑
i∈[q]
xi,h ≤ ohu(h), ∀h ∈ H (3)
∑
h∈H
xi,h ≤ ni, ∀i ∈ [q] (4)
xi,h = 0, ∀i ∈ [q], h ∈ H \ A(ti) (5)
xi,h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ni}, oh ∈ {0, 1}, yh ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ [q],∀h ∈ H (6)
Condition (1) ensures that no blocking pair exists. This is checked by enforcing that for
each resident type and hospital h ∈ H it holds that all residents of this type are assigned
to hospitals they prefer to h (in this case, we can set yh = 1) or h is closed or full (in
this case, we can set yh = 0). Condition (2) ensures that no blocking coalition exists
by enforcing that for all closed hospitals the number of residents that are assigned to
hospitals they find worse is below its lower quota. Conditions (3)-(6) ensure that the
assignment encoded in the variables is a feasible assignment by checking whether the
number of resident that are assigned to a hospital is either zero or between its lower and
upper quota, by enforcing that for each resident type the number of assigned residents of
this type is smaller or equal to the number of residents of this type in the instance and
by enforcing that no resident is assigned to a hospital that she does not accept.
Thus, the ILP admits a feasible solution if and only if the given HA-QU
L
instance
admits a stable matching. As the number of variables used in the ILP lies in O(m ·m!), it
is possible to apply Lenstra’s algorithm [20, 18] to solve the problem in O(f(m) · n)-time
for some computable function f .
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However, it is not possible to follow a similar approach to construct a fixed-parameter
tractable algorithm for the the number mquota of hospitals with non-unit lower quota. In
fact, HA-QU
L
is NP-complete even for only three hospitals with non-unit lower quota.
Proposition 3. HA-QU
L
is NP-complete, even if only three hospitals have lower and upper
quota two and all other hospitals have upper quota one.
Proof. We reduce from the NP-hard Clique problem [14], where given a graph G and
an integer k, the task is to decide whether there exists a subset of vertices of size k in G
that are all pairwise adjacent. Given an instance ((V = {v1, . . . vn}, E), k) of Clique, we
construct an HA-QU
L
instance as follows. For each vertex v ∈ V , let ev1, . . . , e
v
pv
be a list
of all edges incident to v.
Construction: For each vertex v ∈ V , we add a vertex hospital hv with lower and
upper quota one. Similarly, for each edge e ∈ E, we add an edge hospital with lower and
upper quota one. Moreover, we add k vertex selection hospitals hvert1 , . . . , h
vert
k and
(
k
2
)
edge selection hospitals hedge1 , . . . , h
edge
(k2)
all with lower and upper quota one.
Turning to the residents, for each vertex v ∈ V , we introduce a vertex resident rv with
the following preferences:
rv : h
vert
1 ≻ · · · ≻ h
vert
k ≻ hev1 ≻ · · · ≻ hevpv ≻ hv.
Moreover, we introduce an edge resident re for each edge e ∈ E with the following
preferences:
hedge1 ≻ · · · ≻ h
edge
(k2)
≻ he.
In addition, we add for each i ∈ [k] a filling agent rfilli with the following preferences:
rfilli : hv1 ≻ · · · ≻ hvn .
Finally, we introduce a penalizing component consisting of three hospitals h1, h2, and h3
all with lower and upper quota two and four residents r∗, r1, r2, and r3:
r∗ : hv1 ≻ · · · ≻ hvn ≻ h1 r1 : h1 ≻ h2 r2 : h2 ≻ h3 r3 : h3 ≻ h1.
The general idea behind the construction is that
(
k
2
)
edge hospitals need to be closed and
that the vertex residents corresponding to their end point need to be matched to a vertex
selection hospital, implying that the vertices matched to vertex selection hospitals form
a clique. We now show that there exists a clique of size k in the given graph if and only
if there exists a stable matching in the constructed HA-QU
L
instance.
(⇒) Let V ′ = {vi1 , . . . vik} ⊆ V be a clique of size k in (V,E) and E(V
′) =
{ej1 , . . . , ej(k2)
} the set of all edges lying in the clique. We claim that the following match-
ing M is stable:
M ={(hvertℓ , {rviℓ }) | ℓ ∈ [k]} ∪ {(h
edge
ℓ , {rejℓ}) | ℓ ∈ [
(
k
2
)
]}
∪ {(hv , {rv}) | v ∈ V \ V
′} ∪ {(he, {re}) | e ∈ E \ E(V
′)}
∪ {(hviℓ , {r
fill
ℓ }) | ℓ ∈ [k]} ∪ {(h1, {r
∗, r1})} ∪ {(h3, {r
2, r3})}
As no hospital is undersubscribed, only blocking coalitions can block M . Consequently,
it is enough to iterate over all empty hospitals and argue why there does not exist a
blocking coalition to open them. The only empty hospitals are h2 and the edge hospitals
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corresponding to edges lying in the clique. As r1 is matched to its most preferred hospital,
there does not exist a blocking coalition to open h2. Moreover, as V
′ is a clique for all
edge hospitals that are empty, both vertex residents that find this hospital acceptable are
matched to vertex selection hospitals and therefore do not want to open this hospital.
(⇐) Let M be a stable matching in the constructed HA-QU
L
instance. First of all
note that r∗ needs to be matched to h1, as otherwise no stable matching of the three
residents r1, r2, and r3 to the three hospitals h1, h2, and h3 can exist. Thus, all vertex
hospitals need to be filled, which is only possible if all vertex residents are matched to
vertex or vertex selection hospitals. From this it follows that exactly
(
k
2
)
edge hospitals
need to be empty, as all edge residents prefer a edge selection hospital to their designated
edge hospital and no vertex resident can be matched to an edge hospital. Because M
is stable, no vertex resident can form a blocking coalition to open one of the
(
k
2
)
closed
edge hospitals, which is only possible if all vertex residents corresponding to endpoints of
the corresponding
(
k
2
)
edges are assigned to one of the k vertex selection hospitals. This
implies that the vertices assigned to vertex selection hospitals form a clique.
3.3.3 Number of open (or closed) hospitals in a stable matching.
As there may exist stable matchings of different sizes in the studied many-to-one matching
problems, one might want to find a matching with the lowest/highest number of open
hospitals. For instance, this could be useful in applications where opening a hospital comes
at some cost or where organizers get money or receive points for each opened hospital.
The associated decision problem is to decide for some given number mopen whether there
exists a stable matching in which exactly mopen hospitals are open. Obviously, it is also
possible to ask the question for the dual parameter, i.e., the number mclosed of closed
hospitals in a stable matching.
For the HA-QU
L
model, parameterized hardness results for both parameters are already
implied by previously presented reduction. For mopen, in the reduction from Theorem 3
from Independent Set there exists an independent set in the given instance if and
only if there exists a stable matching in the constructed HA-QU
L
instance with four open
hospitals. Moreover, W[1]-hardness for the parameter mclosed follows from the reduction
from Proposition 3.
Corollary 2. Deciding whether there exists a stable matching with four open hospitals in a
HA-QU
L
instance is NP-hard. Deciding whether there exists a stable matching with mclosed
closed hospitals in a HA-QU
L
instance is W[1]-hard parameterized by mclosed, even if one
knows that otherwise no stable matching exists and only three hospitals have non-unit
upper quota.
We were unable to find an XP algorithm for the parameter mclosed or prove para-NP-
hardness. Therefore, we have to leave this problem for future work.
For the other two models, the parameterized hardness for the parameter mopen fol-
lows from the proof of Theorem 2 where we reduced from Clique, which is W[1]-hard
parameterized by the solution size k, and created an instance with only 5k agents. Con-
sequently, in every stable matching, at most 5k hospitals can open, which implies that
this reduction also proves W[1]-hardness parameterized by the number of open hospitals
in the requested stable matching:
Corollary 3. Deciding whether there exists a stable matching with mopen open hospitals
in a HR-QL or HR-Q
U
L
instance is W[1]-hard parameterized by mopen.
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Turning now to the dual parameter mclosed, none of the previous reductions has any
implication on the complexity of the problem with respect to this parameter, as we have
always used the closed hospitals to encode some constraints on the solution. For instance,
in a reduction from Clique, we have created a hospital for each edge in the given graph,
which were all left empty in all stable matchings. This may lead to the initial hypothesis
that restricting the number of closed hospitals makes the problem easier. Unfortunately,
it turns out that this is not the case, as it is possible to somewhat switch the roles of open
and closed hospitals to prove W[1]-hardness of this problem.
Proposition 4. Parameterized by mclosed, deciding whether there exists a stable matching
with mclosed closed hospitals in a HR-QL or HR-Q
U
L
instance is W[1]-hard, even if one
knows that otherwise there does not exist any stable matching.
Proof. We reduce form Multicolored Clique. Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph
with a partitioning of the vertices in k different colors V1, . . . Vk. Without loss of generality,
we assume that there do not exist any edges between vertices of the same color. Moreover,
for each c 6= c′ ∈ [k], let Ecc′ denote the set of edges with one endpoint colored in c and the
other endpoint colored in c′, i.e., e = {u, v} ∈ Ecc′ if (u ∈ Vc∧v ∈ Vc′)∨ (v ∈ Vc∧u ∈ Vc′).
Parameterized by k, Multicolored Clique is W[1]-hard [27]. Given an instance of
Multicolored Clique, we now construct an instance of HR-QL.
Construction: We start by introducing a penalizing component consisting of four
hospitals: h∗ with lower quota
(
k
2
)
+ 2 and h1, h2, and h3 each with lower quota two.
Moreover, we introduce four penalizing residents r∗, r1, r2, and r3 with the following
preferences:
r∗ : h∗ ≻ h1, r1 : h1 ≻ h2, r2 : h2 ≻ h3, r3 : h3 ≻ h1.
For each color c ∈ [k], we insert a vertex hospital hv with lower quota n
3|Vc| for each
vertex of this color v ∈ Vc. We introduce n
3 residents riv,v′ for each v
′ 6= v ∈ Vc with the
following preferences:
riv,v′ : hv ≻ hv′ ,∀i ∈ [n
3].
In addition, for each color-pair c 6= c′ ∈ [k] and each edge e = {u, v} ∈ Ecc′, we introduce
an edge hospital he with lower quota |Ecc′ |+1. We add a penalizing resident r
∗
e with the
following preferences:
r∗e : he ≻ h
∗.
Moreover, we introduce for each e′ 6= e ∈ Ecc′ an edge resident re,e′ with the following
preferences
re,e′ : he ≻ hu ≻ hv ≻ he′ .
We set mclosed := k +
(
k
2
)
+ 1. In a stable matching, all but one hospital corresponding
to vertices of one color should be open. The closed hospital corresponds to the selected
vertex from this color for the clique. Similarly, for each color combination c 6= c′ ∈ [k], we
introduced a gadget consisting of one hospital for each edge with this color combination.
In a stable matching, all but one hospital in this gadget should be open and the closed
hospital corresponds to the edge with this color combination lying in the constructed
clique. We show that there exists a multicolored clique in the given graph if and only if
there exists a stable matching with mclosed hospitals in the constructed HR-QL instance.
(⇒) Let V ′ ⊆ V be a clique in G with |V ′∩Vc| = 1 for all c ∈ [k]. We denote by v
∗
c the
vertex from V ′∩Vc. Let E(V
′) denote the set of all edges lying in the clique, i.e., all edges
where both endpoints belong to V ′. Note that for each color pair c 6= c′ ∈ [k] it holds that
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|E(V ′)∩Ecc′ | = 1. From this, we construct a stable matchingM . For each c ∈ [k] and each
v ∈ Vc \V
′, we match to hv all residents with hv as top choice, i.e.,
⋃
v′ 6=v∈Vc∧i∈[n3]
{riv,v′},
and all residents which have hv∗c as their top-choice and hv as their second choice, i.e.,⋃
i∈[n3]{r
i
v∗c ,v
}. Moreover, for each color pair c 6= c′ ∈ [k] and for each edge e ∈ Ecc′\E(V
′),
we match to he all edge residents re,e′ with he as top choice, i.e.,
⋃
e′ 6=e∈Ecc′
{re,e′}, the
penalizing resident r∗e , and the resident re∗,e where {e
∗} = Ecc′∩E(V
′). Finally, we match
r∗ and r1 to hospital h1 and r2 and r3 to hospital h3. We now argue that M is stable.
The only edge residents that are not matched to their top choice are the edge resi-
dents re∗,e and r
∗
e∗ for e
∗ ∈ E(V ′). However, for each e∗ ∈ Ecc′ ∩ E(V
′) for some color
pair c 6= c′ ∈ [k], there are only |Ecc′ | residents with he∗ as top choice, and all other
residents that find he∗ acceptable are matched to their top-choice. Thus, there does not
exist a blocking coalition to open he∗ . The only vertex residents that are not matched to
their top choice are the vertex residents corresponding to the vertices of the clique. Note
that for each v ∈ Vc for some color c ∈ [k], there exist only n
3(|Vc| − 1) residents with
hv as top-choice. All other vertex residents that find hv acceptable are matched to their
top-choice. Moreover, there exist at most (n−1)n2 edge residents that find hv acceptable.
As (n− 1)n2 ≤ n3, there cannot exist a blocking coalition of n3|Vc| residents to open hv.
Finally, there exist
(
k
2
)
penalizing residents r∗e that are unmatched. However, as h
∗ has
lower quota
(
k
2
)
+2 and is only preferred by those
(
k
2
)
unmatched penalizing residents and
r∗, there does not exist a blocking coalition to open this hospital.
(⇐) Assume that there exists a stable matchingM in the constructed HR-QL instance.
Note first of all that in a stable matching r∗ needs to be matched to h1, as otherwise r1,
r2, and r3 form a component without a stable matching. This implies that h
∗ needs to be
closed which in turn implies that at most
(
k
2
)
edge hospitals can be closed. For each of the(
k
2
)
color combinations c 6= c′ ∈ [k], the residents only suffice to open |Ecc′ |−1 of the edge
hospitals from the corresponding component. Note further that it is only possible to open
|Ecc′ |− 1 edge hospitals if all edge resident from this component are matched to hospitals
from this component. This implies that all edge residents need to be matched to edge
hospitals, which is only possible if for all
(
k
2
)
closed edge hospitals the vertex hospitals
corresponding to the endpoints of the edge are closed. Note further that for each color
c ∈ [k], at least |Vc| − 1 vertex hospitals from this component are open. Consequently, k
vertex hospitals are closed in every stable matching. If the k closed vertex hospitals do
not form a clique, then there exists an edge e = {v,w} ∈ Ecc′ for some c 6= c
′ ∈ [k] such
that he is closed and hv or hw are open in M . As he is closed and all edge residents are
matched to edge hospitals, re,e′ for some e
′ ∈ Ecc′ forms a blocking pair with hv or hw, as
she prefers being matched to hv or hw over being matched to M(re,e′) = he′ . Thus, the k
vertices corresponding to the closed vertex hospitals form a clique.
4 A Restricted Case: Quota Two
In this section, we consider the special case of HR-QU
L
where all hospitals have lower
quota at most two. We denote this problem by HR-QU
L≤2. We present a polynomial-time
algorithm for HR-QU
L≤2, which constructs a stable matching if it exists. As HR-QL is a
special case of HR-QU
L
, this algorithm also applies to HR-QL instances where all lower
quotas are at most two. The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 4. If the lower quota of each hospital is at most two, then HR-QU
L
(and thereby
also HR-QL) is solvable in O(n
3m) time.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for HR-QU
L≤2 (high-level description)
Input: An HR-QU
L≤2 instance I
Output: A stable matching in I or NO if I does not admit a stable matching.
1: Apply Phase 1a - Propose&Reject
2: S ← {residents with non-empty preferences} ⊲ Initialization
3: while there exists some resident r with at least two hospitals on her preferences do
4: Apply Phase 1a - Propose&Reject
5: while a hospital holding at least two proposals exists do
6: for each hospital h holding at least two proposals do
7: Split h into u(h) hospitals h1, . . . , hu(h) ⊲ Phase 1b
8: Apply Phase 1a - Propose&Reject
9: if there exists some resident r with at least two hospitals on her preferences then
10: Find a generalized rotation R. ⊲ Phase 2
11: Eliminate R.
12: if all residents from S have exactly one hospital on their preferences left then
13: return matching M that matches every resident r with non-empty preferences to
the hospital from I corresponding to the remaining hospital on her preferences.
14: return NO
We split the proof of this result in two sections. In the first section, we give a descrip-
tion of our algorithm. In the second section, we prove its correctness.
In the following, we refer to all hospitals with lower quota one as quota-one hospitals
and to all hospitals with lower quota two as quota-two hospitals.
4.1 Description of the Algorithm
Algorithm 1 gives a high-level description of our algorithm. The algorithm consists of two
phases (Phase 1 and Phase 2), where the first phase is again split into Phase 1a and Phase
1b. Phase 1a identifies hospital-resident pairs which cannot be part of a stable matching
using a propose-and-reject approach. Subsequently, for each such hospital-resident pair
(r, h), hospital h is deleted from the preferences of r and vice versa. Furthermore, Phase
1a identifies some quota-two hospitals which are open in every stable matching. Phase
1b further simplifies the instance by replacing quota-two hospitals that are open in every
stable matching by multiple copies of this hospital with lower quota one. Phase 1a and
Phase 1b are applied repeatedly until no hospital from which we know that it is open in
every stable matching exists. After that, in Phase 2, we identify substructures which we
call “generalized rotations” and subsequently eliminate them by deleting the acceptability
of some hospital-resident pairs. While Phase 1 keeps the number of stable matchings
identical, Phase 2 may reduce the number of stable matchings in the instance, but still
guarantees that at least one stable matching survives (if there exists one in the original
instance).
The algorithm applies Phase 1 and Phase 2 alternately until every resident has at most
one hospital on her preferences. The algorithm returns NO if, after the initialization, the
preferences of a resident got empty, as one can show that all residents with non-empty
preferences are matched in every stable matching. Otherwise, the algorithm constructs
a stable matching where all residents with empty preferences are unmatched and all
residents with non-empty preferences are matched to the hospital on their preference list
(if this hospital was created by splitting a hospital h, then the resident is matched to h).
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Our algorithm is inspired by Irving’s algorithm for Stable Roommates [16]. While
the general structure of the two algorithms is similar (two phases, where the first one
is based on a propose-and-reject approach and the second one on a substructure called
“(generalized) rotation”), the Propose&Reject-Phase and especially the definition of a
rotation needs to be significantly extended and fundamentally reworked for HR-QU
L≤2.
The main reason for this is the presence of quota-two hospitals for which we do not know
whether they are open in a stable matching, even if they receive a proposal.
We now describe Phases 1a, 1b, and 2 in more detail. We start by making an obser-
vation that allows us to assume that quota-one hospitals have upper quota one:
Observation 3. In every HR-QU
L
instance, it is possible to replace all quota-one hospi-
tals h ∈ H by u(h) copies h1, . . . , hu(h) each with lower and upper quota one and with the
same preferences as h. In the preferences of residents, h is replaced by h1 ≻ · · · ≻ hu(h).
4.1.1 Phase 1a - Propose&Reject.
In Phase 1a, residents and hospitals propose to one another. Residents always propose
to hospitals and hospitals always to residents. If a resident r ∈ R proposes to a hospital
h ∈ H, then the receiver h of the proposal can either accept or reject the proposal from
r. We say that a hospital h holds a proposal r if r proposed to h and h did not reject the
proposal (until now). We say that a resident r (currently) issues a proposal if there exists a
hospital h that holds the proposal r. The notation also applies if the roles of residents and
hospitals are swapped. Considering quota-two hospitals, we distinguish between activated
and deactivated hospitals. Initially, all quota-two hospitals are deactivated.
Algorithm (Phase 1a). We proceed in multiple rounds. In each round, an arbitrary
resident or quota-one hospital with non-empty preferences that does not currently issue a
proposal or an activated quota-two hospital is selected. If a resident or quota-one hospital
is selected, then it proposes to the first hospital or resident on its preference list. If an
activated quota-two hospital h is selected, then the hospital proposes to the first u(h)
residents on its preference list unless h received exactly one proposal from a resident r
which is among the first u(h) residents in h’s preferences: In this case, h only proposes
to the first u(h) − 1 residents that are not r.
If a resident or a quota-one hospital receives a proposal, then it accepts the proposal
if it does not hold a proposal or if it prefers its new proposal to the one it currently holds.
Similarly, it rejects a proposal if it either already holds or later receives a better proposal.
A quota-two hospital h accepts a proposal r if it does not hold u(h) proposals it prefers
to r. It rejects a proposal r if it holds or at some point receives u(h) proposals it prefers
to r, or if the hospital has been rejected by all but one resident on its preference list. If
an agent a proposes to an agent a′ and a′ rejects the proposal, then we delete a′ from the
preference list of a and a from the preference list of a′.
A quota-two hospital h gets activated if it receives a proposal or if one of its proposals
gets rejected. If h currently holds exactly one proposal by one of its u(h) most preferred
residents r, then it gets deactivated if it currently issues u(h)−1 proposals or has proposed
to all residents on its preference list except r. Otherwise, it gets deactivated if it currently
issues u(h) proposals or has proposed to all residents on its preference list.
At the end of Phase 1a, we delete from the preferences of all quota-one hospitals and
residents holding a proposal all agents to which they prefer the held proposal. Subse-
quently, we restore the mutual acceptability of agents by deleting for each agent a an
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I h1 : r3 ≻ r1 r1 : h1 ≻ h2
h2 : r1 ≻ r2 r2 : h4 ≻ h2 ≻ h3
h3 : r2 ≻ r3 r3 : h3 ≻ h1 ≻ h4
h4 : r2 ≻ r3
II h1 : r3 ≻ r1 r1 : h1 ≻ h2
h2 : r1 ≻ r2 r2 : h2 ≻ h3
h3 : r2 ≻ r3 r3 : h3 ≻ h1
h4 :
Figure 1: An example for Phase 1. Hospital h1 is a quota-one hospital, while the other
three hospitals are quota-two hospitals. In the beginning (see instance I), each resident
and h1 propose to the first agent on their preferences. All agents accept their received
proposal. Since h4 receives a proposal from r2 and h3 receives a proposal from r3, they
get activated and propose to r3 respectively r2. Resident r3 rejects the proposal from h4,
as she holds the proposal of h1, while r2 accepts the proposal of h3. Then, the preferences
of h4 contain only one resident, and thus h4 rejects the proposal from r2. Consequently,
r2 proposes to h2, which activates h2. Subsequently, h2 proposes to r1, who accepts the
proposal. As no quota-two hospital received two proposals, no hospital gets split and
Phase 1 ends. The resulting instance is depicted as instance II.
agent a′ from its preference list if a does not appear on the preference list of a′. Finally,
we delete all quota-two hospitals with at most one resident on their preference list.
The intuitive reasoning behind Phase 1a is the following. If an agent rejects the
proposal of another agent, then the two can never be matched to each other in a stable
matching. Thereby, no agent can be matched better than the agent it proposes to.
Thus, any agent receiving a proposal can be sure that it does not end up worse than the
proposal it currently holds in a stable matching, since it forms a blocking pair with the
agent issuing its proposal otherwise. After Phase 1a, each resident and quota-one hospital
issues a proposal to the first agent on its preference list and holds a proposal from the last
agent on its preference list. The formal correctness proof of this phase consists of proving
that, in a stable matching, no agent can be matched to an agent which was deleted from
its preferences during Phase 1a and that all matchings that are stable after applying
Phase 1a are also stable before applying Phase 1a.
4.1.2 Phase 1b - split hospitals.
In this phase, we identify quota-two hospitals that are open in every stable matching and
replace them by quota-one hospitals:
Algorithm (Phase 1b). We replace each quota-two hospital h holding at least two
proposals by u(h) hospitals h1, . . . , hu(h) with lower and upper quota one with the same
preferences as h. In the preferences of all residents, h is replaced by h1 ≻ · · · ≻ hu(h).
It is possible to show that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between stable
matchings before and after the application of Phase 1b. To summarize, Phase 1 consists
of applying Phase 1a and Phase 1b as long as at least one hospital was split in the last
execution of Phase 1b. An example for the execution of Phase 1 can be found in Figure 1.
4.1.3 Phase 2 - eliminate generalized rotations.
We introduce some notation for the definition of a generalized rotation. We call a quota-
two hospital with more than two residents on its preferences flexible and all other quota-
two hospitals inflexible. Note that while we already know which residents will be assigned
to an open inflexible hospital (as the number of residents on its preferences is equal to its
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I h1 : r3 ≻ r1 r1 : h1 ≻ h2
h2 : r1 ≻ r2 r2 : h2 ≻ h3
h3 : r2 ≻ r3 r3 : h3 ≻ h1
II h1 : r3 r1 : h2
h2 : r1 ≻ r2 r2 : h2
h3 : r3 r3 : h3 ≻ h1
Figure 2: An example for Phase 2. Hospital h1 is a quota-one hospital, while the other
two hospitals are quota-two hospitals. Initially (see instance I), h1 holds the proposal of
r1, h2 the proposal of r2, and h3 the proposal of r3. The instance admits the following
generalized rotation: (r1, h1), (r3, r2). Note that for b1 = h1 case BA-1 applies, for a1 = r1
case AB+-3b(i) applies, for b2 = r2 case BA-3 applies, and for a2 = r3 case AB
+-3a applies.
Eliminating this generalized rotation results in the instance II.
lower quota), this is not clear for open flexible hospitals. Given a resident r, we denote by
h(r) the first hospital on r’s preferences. If h(r) is flexible, then we define g(r) := h(r).
Otherwise, we define g(r) to be the second hospital on r’s preference list.
A generalized rotation is a sequence (a1, b1), . . . , (ak, bk) consisting of residents and
quota-one hospitals with ai 6= aj for all i 6= j such that (all following indices are taken
modulo k):
Relationship between ai and bi+1:
AB+−1 If ai is a quota-one hospital, then bi+1 is the second resident on ai’s preferences.
AB+−2 If ai is a resident and h(ai) is a flexible hospital, then bi+1 is the second-most
preferred resident on h(ai)’s preferences who is not ai.
If ai is a resident and h(ai) is an inflexible hospital or a quota-one hospital and
AB+−3a if g(ai) is a quota-one hospital, then bi+1 := g(ai).
AB+−3b(i) if g(ai) is a quota-two hospital holding a proposal r, then bi+1 := r.
AB+−3b(ii) if g(ai) is a quota-two hospital which does not hold a proposal, then
bi+1 is g(ai)’s most preferred resident who is not ai.
Relationship between bi and ai:
BA−1 If bi is a quota-one hospital, then ai is the last resident on bi’s preferences.
BA−2 If bi is a resident and the last hospital h on bi’s preferences is of quota one, then
ai := h.
BA−3 If bi is a resident and the last hospital h on bi’s preferences is of quota two, then
ai is the resident with h as top-choice, i.e., the resident proposing to h.
Algorithm (Phase 2). Phase 2 computes a generalized rotation by starting with an
arbitrary resident whose preference list has length at least two as a1 and subsequently
applying the relationships depicted above to find b2, a2, . . . until this procedure cycles
and a generalized rotation has been found. It is possible to prove that this procedure is
guaranteed to find a generalized rotation. Subsequently, we eliminate the found rotation
by deleting, for all i ∈ [k], the mutual acceptability of ai and bi if one of them is a hospital,
and otherwise the mutual acceptability of hospital h(ai) and bi. After that, Phase 1 is
applied again to the resulting instance.
An example for Phase 2 can be found in Figure 2. The correctness proof of this
phase starts with showing that if there exists a stable matching in the instance before
the elimination of a generalized rotation, then there also exists a stable matching after its
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elimination. For the other direction, we show that each matching that is stable after the
elimination of a generalized rotation, and matches all residents with non-empty preferences
(for whom it can be proven that they have to be matched in any stable matching), is also
stable before its elimination.
In a “classical” rotation (a1, b1), . . . , (ak, bk) for Stable Roommates [16], for all
i ∈ [k], agent bi+1 is the second agent on the preference list of ai and ai is the last
agent on the preference list of bi, which implies that bi is the top-choice of ai. Here,
eliminating a rotation consists of deleting the mutual acceptability of ai and bi for all
i ∈ [k] and results in an instance that admits a stable matching if the original instance
admits one. Part of the reason for this is that if we assume that there exists a stable
matching M which contains the pairs (ai, bi) for all i ∈ [k], then the matching M
′ arising
by replacing these pairs by the pairs (ai, bi+1) is also stable: Each agent bi prefers M
′
over M , and agent ai can only form a blocking pair with bi, implying that no blocking
pair has been introduced. However, applying this classical definition to HR-QU
L≤2, the
observation from above does not longer hold. Therefore, we generalize the definition of a
rotation in a way such that no quota-two hospital appears in a generalized rotation, while
keeping the intuition: For BA−1 and BA−2, ai is still bi’s least preferred agent, while
for BA−3 following the classical definition, it would be necessary to set ai to a quota-two
hospital h. Instead, we set ai to be the resident proposing to h, which can be interpreted
as matching bi to h together with ai. For the relationship between ai and bi+1, for AB
+−1,
bi+1 is still the second agent in the preferences of ai. For AB
+−2, it is necessary to recall
that for a flexible hospital h there exist multiple possibilities which residents are matched
to h in a stable matching. The “most preferred option” of a resident r is to be matched
to h(r) together with h(r)’s most preferred remaining resident, while her second-most
preferred option is to be matched to h(r) with h(r)’s second-most preferred remaining
resident. If h(r) is inflexible, then there exists only one possibility for a resident r to be
matched to h(r) so her second-most preferred alternative is to be matched to g(r) with
the necessary case distinctions made in AB+−3a, AB+−3b(i), and AB+−3b(ii).
4.2 Proof of Correctness of the Algorithm
In the following section, we prove the correctness of the presented algorithm. We start
by proving the correctness for each phase separately. For both phases, their correctness
implies that there exists a stable matching in the instance after the execution of the phase
if and only if there exists a stable matching in the original instance. Finally, we put the
correctness of both phases together to prove the correctness of the full algorithm.
4.2.1 Phase 1a
To prove the correctness of Phase 1a, we start by showing that if an agent deletes another
agent from its preference list, then they cannot be matched in a stable matching. To do
so, we iterate over all possible cases in Phase 1a where the preferences of an agent gets
modified.
In the following, we slightly abuse notation by calling a blocking coalition (h, {r}) to
open a quota-one hospital also a blocking pair.
Lemma 1. If an agent a rejects the proposal of another agent a′, then a cannot be matched
to a′ in any stable matching.
Proof. Assume that the lemma does not hold, and let r be the first resident and h the
first hospital such that one of them rejected the other, but M(r) = h in some a stable
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matchingM . There are two possible reasons for this deletion: Either r rejected a proposal
from h or h rejected a proposal from r.
Case 1: r rejected h.
Then r received a proposal from a hospital h′ it prefers over h.
Case 1.1: h′ is a quota-one hospital.
Then h′ has been rejected from all residents it prefers over r. By the choice of r
and h, it follows that h′ cannot be matched to a resident it prefers over r. Thus, (r, h′) is
a blocking pair for M , a contradiction.
Case 1.2: h′ is a quota-two hospital.
Then h′ has received a proposal from some resident r′ before proposing to r, as it
otherwise does not propose to any hospital. By the choice of h and r, it follows that r′
cannot be matched to a hospital it prefers over h′. It follows that if h′ is closed in M ,
then (h′, {r, r′}) is a blocking coalition in M , a contradiction. Furthermore, r is one of
the first u(h′) residents on the preferences of h′ which did not reject h′. By the choice
of h and r, it follows that h′ is not matched to u(h′) resident it prefers over r. Thus, if h′
is open, then (h′, r) is a blocking pair.
Case 2: h rejected r.
Case 2.1: h is a quota-one hospital.
Then before rejecting r, hospital h received a proposal from a resident r′ it prefers
over r. By the choice of h and r, it follows that r′ prefers h toM(r′). Consequently, (h, r′)
is blocking pair in M , a contradiction.
Case 2.2: h is a quota-two hospital.
The hospital h cannot reject r because it has been rejected by all other residents on
its preference list, as otherwise r′ with r 6= r′ ∈ M(h) has been rejected by h before h
rejected r, contradicting the choice of h and r. Thus before rejecting r, hospital h received
proposals from u(h) residents r1, . . . , ru(h) which h prefers over r. By the choice of h
and r, it follows that ri cannot be matched to a hospitals it prefers over h for all i ∈ [u(h)].
As r is matched to M , there needs to exists at least one j ∈ [u(h)] with M(rj) 6= h. Then
(h, rj) forms a blocking pair in M , a contradiction.
Recalling that agents propose to other agents in order of their preference list, the
following observation directly follows from Lemma 1.
Observation 4. No resident or quota-one hospital a which issues a proposal to an agent a′
can be matched to an agent a˜ which she prefers to a′ in a stable matching. No quota-
two hospital h which issues a proposal to some residents r1, . . . ru(h) can be matched to a
resident which it prefers to ri for all i ∈ [u(h)] and which does not propose to h in a stable
matching.
Using this observation, it is possible to prove that an agent cannot be matched worse
than the proposal it holds in a stable matching.
Lemma 2. If a resident or a quota-one hospital a holds the proposal of another agent a′,
then there cannot exist a stable matching in which a is matched to an agent a˜ to which it
prefers a′.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists a stable matching M
where a is matched a˜ while holding a proposal from an agent a′ it prefers to a˜.
If a is a quota-one hospital, then a˜ and a′ are both residents and by Observation 4, a′
needs to prefer a to M(a′). Thus, (a, a′) forms a blocking pair.
If a is a resident and a′ is a quota-one hospital, then by Observation 4, a′ needs to
prefer a to M(a′). Thus, (a′, a) forms a blocking pair.
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If a is a resident and a′ is a quota-two hospital which is closed in M , then as a′ issues
a proposal there needs to exists a resident r issuing a proposal to a′. By Observation 4, r
needs to prefer a′ to M(r). Thus, a and r form together a blocking coalition to open a′.
If a is a resident and a′ is a quota-two hospital which is open in M , then by Observa-
tion 4, a′ cannot be matched to u(h) residents which a′ all prefers to a. Thus, (a′, a) is a
blocking pair for M .
Using the two proceeding lemmas, we are now able to prove that all changes made
to the preferences during Phase 1a do not delete any stable matchings, i.e., the mutual
acceptability of no hospital-residents pair occurring in any stable matching is deleted in
Phase 1a.
Corollary 4. If an agent a deletes another agent a′ from its preference list, then a cannot
be matched to a′ in any stable matching.
Proof. There are four types of modifications applied to the agents’ preferences in Phase 1a.
First, an agent might delete another agent from its preferences because one of them
rejected the proposal of the other. Here, the correctness follows directly from Lemma 1.
Second, a resident or quota-one hospital might delete an agent from its preference list
because it holds a proposal it prefers to the deleted agent. Here, the correctness follows
directly from Lemma 2.
Third, a might delete a′ from its preference list because it does not appear on the
preference list of a′. This implies that a′ has deleted a from its preferences because of
one of the two proceeding cases. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, this implies that a and a′
cannot be matched in any stable matching.
Fourth, if a is a resident, then a quota-two hospital a′ with only a on its preference
list might get deleted from the preferences of a. As a′ has only a on its preference list
left, by the proceeding three observation, it follows that a′ cannot be open in any stable
matching and thereby that a can never be matched to a′ in a stable matching.
Now, we show that the modifications of preferences made in Phase 1a do not delete
any blocking coalitions or pairs, i.e., each matching that is stable after applying Phase 1a
is also stable before applying Phase 1a:
Lemma 3. Any matching M that is stable in the instance Iafter after applying Phase 1a
is also stable in the instance Ibefore before applying Phase 1a.
Proof. Let h and r be the first hospital and resident pair such that the mutual acceptabil-
ity of h and r is deleted and both h and r appear in a blocking coalition (h, {r, r1}) for
some r1 ∈ R or as a blocking pair (h, r) for some matching M in I
before that is stable in
Iafter. We iterate over the four possibilities for the deletion of the mutual acceptability as
discussed in Corollary 4. Note that it is possible to reduce the described scenarios which
lead to a deletion of a mutual acceptability to only four possibilities, namely
• that r received a better proposal than h (which may lead to a deletion because r
rejects the proposal from h or at the end of Phase 1a because r holds a proposal it
prefers to h), or
• that h is a quota-one hospital and received a better proposal than r (which may
lead to a deletion because h rejects the proposal from r or at the end of Phase 1a
because h holds a proposal it prefers to r), or
• that h′ is a quota-two hospital and received u(h) proposals it prefers to r (which
may lead to a deletion because h rejects the proposal of r), or
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• that h′ is a quota-two hospital and has only r left on its preferences (which may
lead to a deletion because h rejects the proposal of r or because h is deleted from
the instance).
Case 1: r received a proposal h′ it prefers over h.
Thus, at the end of Phase 1a, r holds a proposal from a hospital h′ it prefers over h.
However, as r forms a blocking pair or coalition with h, resident r needs to be matched
worse than h in M and therefore also worse than h′.
Case 1.1: h′ is a quota-one hospital.
Since r is the first resident on the preferences of h′ in Iafter, hospital h′ is matched
worse than r or not matched at all, implying that (h′, r) is a blocking pair or (h′, {r}) a
blocking coalition in Iafter (since r holds a proposal of h′, the mutual acceptability has
not been deleted).
Case 1.2: h′ is a quota-two hospital.
Before proposing to r, hospital h′ received a proposal from a resident r′. Since h′
is not rejected by r, it still holds at least one proposal from r′. Therefore r′ cannot be
matched better than h′ (as h′ is the first hospital in the preferences of r′ in Iafter), and
as h′ proposes to r, hospital h′ can have at most u(h′)− 1 agents it prefers over r on its
preferences in Iafter. If h′ is closed in M , then (h′, {r, r′}) is a blocking coalition for M in
Iafter. Otherwise, (h′, r) is a blocking pair for M in Iafter.
Case 2: h is a quota-one hospital and received a proposal it prefers over r.
Then, h holds a proposal from a resident r′ it prefers over r at the end of Phase 1a.
Moreover, h is the first hospital in the preferences of r′ in Iafter. Thus, as (h, r) is a
blocking pair for M in Ibefore, h cannot be matched to r′. Thus, (h, r′) needs a blocking
pair for M even in Iafter, a contradiction.
Case 3: h is a quota-two hospital and received u(h) proposals from residents it
prefers over r.
Let s1, . . . , su(h) be the residents whose proposal h holds at the end of Phase 1a.
Since h is the first hospital in the preferences of si for all i ∈ [u(h)], it follows that
none of s1, . . . , su(h) prefers M(si) over h. However, as (h, r) is a blocking pair for M
in Ibefore, h is undersubscribed or there exist one resident that is matched to h to which h
prefers r. Thereby, for at least one j ∈ [u(h)], resident sj is not matched to h in M which
implies that (h, sj) is a blocking pair for M in I
after, a contradiction.
Case 4: h is a quota-two hospital with only r on its preference list.
Then h needs to be closed in M (as it has been deleted from the instance Iafter/
its preferences are empty in Iafter). Thus, by our assumption, (h, {r, r1}) is a blocking
coalition to open h in Ibefore. However, for h to have only r on its preference list left, r1
needs to reject h. Then, we are again in Case 1 and can thereby conclude that r1 cannot
be part of a blocking coalition in M .
We finish the description and correctness proof of this phase by drawing two conclu-
sions about the set of agents matched in a stable matching:
Corollary 5. After applying Phase 1a,
1. all residents and quota-one hospitals holding a proposal are matched in all stable
matchings.
2. if a quota-two hospital h holds two proposals, then h is open in all stable matchings.
Proof. 1. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a stable matching M in
which a resident r currently holding proposal h is unmatched. If h is a quota-one hospital,
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then we know by Observation 4 that h cannot be matched to a resident it prefers to r.
Thus, (h, r) blocksM . If h is a quota-two hospital, let r′ 6= r be a resident that activated h
by proposing to it. By Observation 4, r′ cannot be matched to a hospital she prefers to h′.
Thus, if h is closed in M , (h, {r, r′}) forms a blocking coalition to open h. As h proposed
to r, by Observation 4, there cannot exist u(h) residents that h prefers to r and that can
be matched to h in a stable matching. Consequently, if h is open, (h, r) is a blocking pair.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a stable matching M in which
a quota-one hospital h currently holding proposal r is unmatched. Then, we know by
Observation 4 that r cannot be matched to a hospital it prefers to h. Thus, (h, r) is a
blocking coalition in M .
2. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a stable matching M in which a
quota-two hospital h which received two proposals from residents r and r′ is closed. From
Observation 4 it follows that both r and r′ cannot be matched to a hospital they prefer
to h. Thus, {r, r′} form a blocking coalition to open h.
4.2.2 Phase 1b
We now prove that there exists a one-to-one mapping between the set of stable matchings
before and after the application of Phase 1b:
Lemma 4. There exists a one-to-one mapping between the stable matchings in the in-
stance Ibefore before applying Phase 1b and in the instance Iafter after applying Phase
1b.
Proof. Let h be a quota-two hospital holding two proposals, and let Ibefore be the instance
before splitting h and Iafter the instance after splitting h. The function σ which assigns a
matching M with M(h) = {r1, . . . , rk} and h preferring ri to ri+1 for all i ∈ [k] in I
before
to the matching σ(M) = (M \ {(h, {r1, . . . , rk})}) ∪ {(h
1, r1), . . . , (h
k, rk)} in I
after is a
bijection from the set of stable matchings in Ibefore to the stable matchings in Iafter.
Let M be a stable matching in Ibefore. By Corollary 5, h is open in M . We claim
that M ′ := σ(M) is a stable matching in Iafter. Any blocking coalition or pair must
contain one resident from r1, r2, . . . , rk or a hospital from h
1, . . . , hk. If a blocking
coalition or pair involves ri for some i ∈ [k], then it must also involve a hospital h
j for
some j ∈ [k], as there does not exist a hospital that ri prefers to h
1, . . . , hk which she does
not prefer to h. However, since hℓ and rℓ prefer each other over rp and h
p for ℓ < p, there
is no such blocking coalition or pair. Next, assuming that for some r ∈ R \ {r1, . . . , rk}
and i ∈ [k], (hi, r) is a blocking pair for M ′, then hi prefers r over ri and r prefers hi over
M(r), and therefore (h, r) is a blocking pair for M , a contradiction.
Vice versa, let M ′ be a stable matching in Iafter. Note that h holds at least two
proposal in Ibeforeand that h1 and h2 are the first choices of the two residents proposing
to h. Therefore, h1 and h2 are both matched in M ′. Assume that hi is matched to
an agent ri for all i ∈ [k] for some k ≤ u(h). Note that due to the stability of M
′
hospital h needs to prefer ri over ri+1 for all i ∈ [k − 1]. We claim that M := σ
−1(M ′) =(
M ′ \ {({hi, {ri}) : i ∈ [k]}
)
∪ {(h, {r1, . . . , rk})} is a stable matching in I
before. Any
blocking coalition or pair must involve h and a resident from R \ {r1, . . . , rk} . As h is
open, there cannot exist a blocking coalition in M ′. If there exists a blocking pair (h, s)
for some resident s ∈ R \ {r1, . . . , rk}, then s prefers h to M(s) and h is undersubscribed
or for some j ∈ [k], hospital h prefers s to rj . In the first case, there exists some h
j such
that hj is unmatched, implying that (hj , {s}) is a blocking coalition in M ′, contradicting
the stability of M ′. In the later case, (hj , s) is a blocking pair in M ′, contradicting the
stability of M ′.
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We conclude with several observations about the situation after the excessive appli-
cation of Phase 1 that we will use for the definition of a generalized rotation in Phase 2:
Lemma 5. After the application of Phase 1,
1. each agent either holds and issues exactly one proposal or neither holds nor issues
a proposal.
2. each quota-two hospital
• has upper quota two, and received the proposal of one of its first two residents,
• received a proposal and has only two agents left on its preferences, or
• received no proposal.
3. if an agent a appears on the preference list of another agent a′ and a′ has more
than one agent on its preference list, then a also has more than one agent on its
preference list.
Proof. 1. No quota-two hospital holds more than one proposal, as a hospital holding two
proposals gets split into multiple quota-one hospitals in Phase 1b. Thereby, every agent
can hold at most one proposal.
We claim that every agent that holds a proposal also issues a proposal. If a resident r
holds a proposal h but does not issue a proposal after Phase 1a, she has proposed to h at
some point. If h is a quota-two hospital, then h would have accepted this proposal, as we
know that h held at most one proposal (since no quota-two hospitals holding two proposals
can exist). If h is a quota-one hospital, then h would have accepted this proposal, as h
cannot hold a proposal r′ it prefers to r, as no quota-one hospital can prefer its held
proposal to its issued proposal. A similar reasoning also applies to quota-one hospitals.
For quota-two hospitals h holding a proposal from a resident r, the claim holds, as in
the case where all residents except r reject the proposal h and thereby h does not issue a
proposal, h rejects the proposal r.
Consequently, as no agent can hold more than one proposal and each agent that holds
a proposal also issues one, every agent issues exactly one proposal and holds exactly one
proposal or neither holds nor issues a proposal.
2. The second statement directly follows from the first one by observing that a quota-
two hospital only issues one proposal in the case where its upper quota is two and it
holds the proposal of one of its first two residents or if it only has two residents on its
preferences left.
3. If the preferences of a only contain a′, then a proposes to a′ and by 1. also receives a
proposal from a′. Thus, a′ is not a quota-two hospital (as any quota-two hospital receiving
exactly one proposal r does not propose to r, and there are no agents receiving multiple
proposals by 1.). It follows a is the first agent in the preferences of a′, and that agents
after a are deleted from the preferences of a′. Thus, the preferences of a′ only contain a, a
contradiction to our initial assumption that a′ has more than one agent on its preference
list.
4.2.3 Phase 2
We start by proving that as long as there exists a resident with more than one hospital
on her preference list, a generalized rotation is guaranteed to exist and can be found in
linear time.
26
Lemma 6. Unless the preference list of every resident contains at most one hospital, a
generalized rotation always exists and can be found in O(min{n,m}) time, where n is the
number of residents and m is the number of hospitals.
Proof. If there exists a resident r with at least two hospitals on her preference list, it is
always possible to find a generalized rotation by starting with setting a1 := r and then
use AB+−1 to AB+−3b(ii) as defined above to find b2 and subsequently BA−1 to BA−3
to find a2. We continue this process until this process cycles we have found some i 6= j
with ai = aj. Note that it is also enough to find some i 6= j with bi = bj as this directly
implies that ai = aj. To give a bound on the maximum number of steps needed until
the process cycles we look at the following two cases separately: For the case where the
number of residents is smaller or equal than the number of hospitals, i.e., n ≤ m, observe
that each pair in a rotation can contain at most one hospital, which implies that each pair
contains at least one resident. As each resident can appear at most twice in a pair once
as a and once as b before a cycle have been found, this implies that at most 2n+ 1 steps
are necessary to fins a rotation. For the case where the number of hospitals is smaller
than the number of residents, i.e., n > m, observe first of all that for each quota-two
hospital h, at most one resident ranking h in first place exists, as each hospital holds at
most one proposal. Note further that in each pair either one of the two involved agents is
a quota-one hospital or a is a resident and h(a) is a quota-two hospital. Thus, there can
exist only 3m different pairs before either a quota-one hospital occurs repeatedly as ai
or bi or a resident with a quota-two hospital as top-choice appears repeatedly as ai. Thus,
after at most 3min{n,m} + 1 steps, which implies that the running time for finding a
generalized rotation lies in O(min{n,m}).
It remains to argue that for residents and quota-one hospitals s with at least two
agents on their preference list if we set ai = s, then bi+1 always exists, has at least two
agents on its preference list and is unique. Moreover, we need to prove the same if we set
bi = s. Note that for all AB
+−1 to AB+−3b(ii) and BA−1 to BA−2, the successor clearly
always exists and is unique. For BA−3, it needs to holds that resident bi holds a proposal
of the last hospital h on her preference list. By Lemma 5, this implies that h also receives
exactly one proposal. Thus ai is well-defined and unique. Furthermore, by Lemma 5, all
computed successors appear on the preferences of agents whose preference list has length
at least two and thereby also have at least two agents on their preference list.
Given an agent ai appearing in a generalized rotation, we say that AB
+−x applies
to ai for x ∈ {1, 2, 3a, 3b(i), 3b(ii)} if case AB
+−x needs to be applied to compute bi+1
from ai. Similarly, for an agent bi appearing in a generalized rotation, we say that BA−x
applies to bi for x ∈ {1, 2, 3} if case BA−x needs to be applied to compute ai from bi.
Moreover, in the following, for two agents a, a′ of which one is a resident and the other is
a quota-one hospital, we write {a, a′} ∈ M to denote that a and a′ are matched to each
other in M . We now show a list of statements needed to prove the correctness of Phase 2.
We start by considering whether and where agents might repeatedly appear in a single
generalized rotation:
Observation 5. In any generalized rotation, bi 6= bj holds for i 6= j.
Proof. If bi = bj holds, then also ai = aj holds, which implies i = j.
Lemma 7. Let (a1, b1), . . . , (ak, bk) be a generalized rotation. If a stable matching M
contains {ai, bi} or (h(ai), {ai, bi}) for all i ∈ [k], then it holds for all i, j ∈ [k] that
(i) ai 6= bj and (ii) gi 6= gj .
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Proof. To prove (i), for the sake of contradicting, let us assume that ai = bj for some i, j ∈
[k]. By BA−1 to BA−3 it follows that i 6= j (for BA−3, note that since bj is part of a
rotation, it follows that bj has at least two hospitals in its preferences, and thus does not
propose to h, the last hospital on its preferences). If ai is a hospital (with quota one) or
ai is a resident and h(ai) is a quota-one hospital, then it also holds that bi = aj , since M
contains {aℓ, bℓ} or (h(aℓ), {aℓ, bℓ}) for all ℓ ∈ [k]. Thus, ai and bi propose to each other,
implying that their preference lists contain only one agent. It follows that they cannot be
part of a generalized rotation. Otherwise ai is a resident and h(ai) is a quota-two hospital.
Thus M contains both (h(ai), {ai, bi}) and (h(aj), {aj , ai}), implying that h(ai) = h(aj).
It follows that both ai and aj issue a proposal to h(ai). Since every hospital with at least
two proposals got split, it follows that ai = aj , a contradiction. Thus, ai 6= bj for all
i, j ∈ [k] holds.
To prove (ii), assume that g := g(ai) = g(aj) for some i 6= j ∈ [k]. Note that g cannot
be a quota-one hospital, as from this it would follow that AB+−3a applies for both ai
and aj which would imply that bi+1 = bj+1, contradicting Observation 5. Thus, we
assume that g is a quota-two hospital and distinguish between the case where g received
a proposal and the case where g did not receive a proposal. We will find for both cases a
resident r appearing both as ai and bj+1, contradicting ai 6= bj for all i, j ∈ [k].
Case 1: g did not receive a proposal.
Then g cannot appear as h(ap) for any p ∈ [k]. Thus, case AB
+−3b(ii) applies for
both ai and aj . Let r be the first resident on g’s preference list. Then bℓ+1 = r if and
only if aℓ 6= r for ℓ ∈ {i, j}. Since ai 6= aj by the definition of a generalized rotation
and bi+1 6= bj+1 by Observation 5, it follows without loss of generality that r = ai
and r 6= aj 6= r. Since aj 6= r, it follows that bj+1 = r.
Case 2: g received a proposal from a resident r.
Then bℓ+1 = r if and only if aℓ 6= r for ℓ ∈ {i, j}. It follows by Observation 5 that
w.l.o.g. r = ai and r 6= aj . Since aj 6= r, it follows that bj+1 = r.
The definition of a generalized rotation implies the following observations.
Observation 6. If for some ai case AB
+−2 applies, i.e., ai is a resident and h(ai) is a
flexible hospital, then
1. bi and bi+1 are also residents.
2. ai and bi are the two first residents on h(ai)’s preference list and bi+1 is the third
resident on h(ai)’s preference list.
Proof. As AB+−2 applies for ai, agent bi+1 is the second-most preferred resident on the
preferences of h(ai) which is not ai. By the definition of h(ai), resident ai proposes
to h(ai), and is therefore by Lemma 5 among the first two residents in the preferences
of h(ai).
We claim that BA−3 applies for bi. If BA−1 applies for bi, then the first choice of ai is
the hospital bi of quota one, a contradiction. If BA−2 applies for bi, then ai is a hospital, a
contradiction. Thus, BA−3 applies for bi. As the preferences of resident bi are non-empty,
it holds a proposal from the last hospital on its preferences. Thus, by BA−3, it holds that
h(ai) proposes to bi, implying that bi is among the first two residents in the preferences
of h(ai), as by Lemma 5 h(ai) has upper quota two.
From Lemma 5, the following observation directly follows.
Observation 7. Let (a1, b1), . . . , (ak, bk) be a generalized rotation. For all i ∈ [k], hospital
h(ai) holds the proposal of ai and if h(ai) is open in a stable matching M , then exactly
two residents are matched to h(ai) one of which must be ai.
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As the final step before proving the correctness of Phase 2, we prove that, similar as
for classical rotations in the Stable Roommates problem, in a stable matching, either
each agent pair in a generalized rotation is matched (either to each other or to a specific
hospital) or none of them.
Lemma 8. Let (a1, b1), . . . , (ak, bk) be a generalized rotation. If a stable match-
ing M contains {ai, bi} or (h(ai), {ai, bi}) for some i ∈ [k], then M contains {ai, bi}
or (h(ai), {ai, bi}) for all i ∈ [k].
Proof. Note that by Observation 7, the hospital h(ai) can be matched to at most two resi-
dents for every i ∈ [k]. Assume that for some i ∈ [k],M contains {ai, bi} or (h(ai), {ai, bi})
and that the following two assumptions hold:
{ai−1, bi−1} /∈M (1)
(h(ai−1), {ai−1, bi−1}) /∈M (2)
We start by making the observation that if ai−1 is a resident and h(ai−1) is a quota-
one hospital or an inflexible hospital, then agent ai−1 cannot be matched to its first
choice h(ai−1) (we refer to this observation in the following as the bad match observation).
We will now make a case distinction over all possible assignments for ai, bi, ai−1,
and bi−1 and argue that from that fact that {ai, bi} ∈ M or (h(ai), {ai, bi}) ∈ M holds
either Assumption (1) or Assumption (2) must be false. Cases marked by (∗) are not
divided into subcases.
Case 1: ai is a resident.
Case 1.1 (∗): bi is a hospital (of quota one), i.e., M contains {ai, bi}.
If bi is a quota-one hospital, then BA−1 applies for bi and AB
+−3a applies for ai−1.
Since BA−1 applies for bi, it follows that ai is the least preferred resident on bi’s preference
list and thereby that bi prefers ai−1 to ai. Since AB
+−3a applies for ai−1, it follows that bi
is ai−1’s second-most preferred hospital and that h(ai−1) is either a quota-one hospital or
an inflexible quota-two hospital. If h(ai−1) is a quota-one hospital, then bi−1 = h(ai−1)
and as we have assumed that (bi−1, {ai−1}) /∈M , resident ai−1 cannot be matched to her
top-choice in M . If h(ai−1) is an inflexible quota-two hospital, then as we have assumed
that (h(ai−1), {ai−1, bi−1}) /∈M and ai−1 and bi−1 are the only two residents on h(ai−1)’s
preference list, ai−1 cannot be matched to its top choice. Thus, both bi and ai−1 prefer
each other to their partner in M , which implies that (bi, ai−1) blocks M .
Case 1.2: bi is a resident, i.e., M contains (h(ai), {ai, bi}).
Then BA−3 applies for bi, which implies that h(ai) is the last hospital on bi’s preference
list. From this it follows that bi holds a proposal from h(ai). As h(ai) only issues one
proposal and holds the proposal of ai, resident bi is the first resident on the preference
list of h(ai) which is not ai.
Case 1.2.1 (∗): ai−1 is a hospital (of quota one).
Then AB+−1 applies for ai−1, which implies that bi is the second resident on ai−1’s
preference list. Moreover note that ai−1’s most preferred resident is bi−1 and that we have
assumed that (ai−1, {bi−1}) /∈M . Thus, ai−1 prefers bi to the resident it is matched to in
M and bi prefers ai−1 to h(ai). This implies that (ai−1, bi) blocks M .
Case 1.2.2: ai−1 is a resident.
Since ai−1 and bi are both resident, for ai−1 either AB
+−2, AB+−3b(i) or AB+−3b(ii)
applies. We iterate over these three possibilities in the following.
Case 1.2.2.1 (∗): h(ai−1) is flexible (AB
+−2 applies for ai−1).
As AB+−2 applies for ai−1, Observation 6 implies that bi is the first resi-
dent on the preference list of h(ai−1) which is neither ai−1 nor bi−1. Recall
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that (h(ai−1), {ai−1, bi−1}) /∈M by Assumption (2) and that bi prefers h(ai−1) to M(bi).
Thus, if h(ai−1) is open, (h(ai−1), bi) blocks M . If h(ai−1) is closed, then ai−1 prefers her
first choice h(ai−1) over M(ai−1), and thus, (h(ai−1), {ai−1, bi}) is a blocking coalition to
open h(ai−1).
Case 1.2.2.2 (∗): h(ai−1) is inflexible or a quota-one hospital and g(ai−1) received
a proposal from a resident r (AB+−3b(i) applies for ai−1).
In this case, it holds by definition of AB+−3b(i) that r = bi and that g(ai−1) is bi’s
top-choice. By Lemma 5, r = bi is among the first two residents on g(ai−1)’s preferences.
By out initial bad match observation, ai−1 is not matched to h(ai−1). As g(ai−1) is the
second-most preferred hospital on the preference list of ai−1 from this it follows that ai−1
is either matched to g(ai−1) or prefers being matched to g(ai−1). If g(ai−1) is open,
then it prefers r over one of the residents it is matched to, while r cannot be matched
to g(ai−1) by our assumption that (h(ai), {ai, bi}) ∈ M and as g(ai−1) 6= h(ai) holds
since r has at least two hospitals on its preference list and thereby h(ai) cannot be the
least preferred hospital of r. This implies that (g(ai−1), r) is a blocking pair. If g(ai−1)
is closed, then (g(ai−1), {ai−1, r}) is a blocking coalition.
Case 1.2.2.3 (∗): h(ai−1) is inflexible or a quota-one hospital and g(ai−1) did not
receive a proposal (AB+−3b(ii) applies for ai−1).
By definition of AB+−3b(ii), resident bi is the first resident which is not ai−1 in the
preferences of g(ai−1). Since g(ai−1) is still in the preferences of bi, it follows that bi
prefers g(ai−1) over the hospital M(bi) = h(ai) (note that g(ai−1) 6= h(ai) as g(ai−1) did
not receive a proposal but h(ai) holds a proposal from ai). By our initial bad match obser-
vation, ai−1 is not matched to h(ai−1), which implies that ai−1 cannot be matched better
than g(ai−1). Thus, if g(ai−1) is not open in M , then (g(ai−1), {ai−1, bi}) is a blocking
coalition for M . Otherwise, as bi is among the first two residents in the preferences of
g(ai−1) but not matched to g(ai−1), (bi, g(ai−1)) is a blocking pair for M .
Case 2: ai is a hospital (of quota one).
Then BA−2 applies for bi. This implies that bi is a resident and ai is the least preferred
hospital on bi’s preference list. It follows that bi holds ai’s proposal and therefore bi is
the most preferred resident of ai.
Case 2.1 (∗): ai−1 is a hospital (of quota one). Then AB
+−1 applies for ai−1.
It follows that bi is the second-most preferred resident of ai−1. Moreover, BA−2 needs
to apply for bi−1 implying that bi−1 it the top choice of ai−1. As by Assumption (1)
hospital ai−1 is not matched to its top choice and we assume that M(bi) = ai which
implies that bi is matched to her least preferred hospital, (ai−1, bi) is a blocking pair
for M .
Case 2.2: ai−1 is a resident.
As bi is a resident, g(ai−1) is a quota-two hospital and either AB
+−2, AB+−3b(i), or
AB+−3b(ii) applies for ai−1.
Case 2.2.1 (∗): h(ai−1) is inflexible or a quota-one hospital (i.e., AB
+−b(i) or
AB+−b(ii) applies for ai−1).
If g(ai−1) holds a proposal r, then AB
+−b(i) applies for ai−1 and bi = r. By
Lemma 5, bi is among the first two residents in the preference list of g(ai−1). If g(ai−1) does
not hold a proposal, then AB+−b(ii) applies for ai−1 and bi is by definition of AB
+−b(ii)
among the first two residents in the preference list of g(ai−1). Note that g(ai−1) 6= h(ai)
since g(ai−1) receives either no proposal or one from bi, while h(ai) receives a proposal
from ai 6= bi.
By our initial bad match observation ai−1 is not matched to h(ai−1) and is therefore
not better matched than g(ai−1). Since resident bi is matched to her least preferred
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hospital ai in M and as g(ai−1) is still on bi’s reduced preferences, it follows that bi
prefers g(ai−1) over her hospital in M . If g(ai−1) is closed, then (g(ai−1), {ai−1, bi}) is
a blocking coalition in M . Otherwise, as bi is among the two most preferred residents
of g(ai−1), (g(ai−1), bi) is a blocking pair for M .
Case 2.2.2 (∗): h(ai−1) is flexible (AB
+−2).
By Observation 6, residents ai−1, bi−1 and bi are the first three residents on the
preference list of h(ai−1). Thus, if h(ai−1) is closed, then (h(ai−1), {ai−1, bi}) is a blocking
coalition, as h(ai−1) is ai−1’s top-choice and bi is matched to her least preferred hospital ai.
Otherwise, by Assumption (2), one of ai−1 and bi−1 are not matched to hi−1, which implies
that (h(ai−1), bi) is a blocking pair for M .
In all cases, we found a blocking coalition or blocking pair for M , contradicting the
stability of M .
Proving the correctness of Phase 2, we start by showing that if there exists a sta-
ble matching before the elimination of a generalized rotation, there also exists a stable
matching after the elimination which matches the same set of residents.
Lemma 9. Let (a1, b1), . . . , (ak, bk) be a generalized rotation. If an instance admits a
stable matching, then it still admits a stable matching which matches the same residents
and quota-one hospitals after the elimination of this generalized rotation.
Proof. Let M be a stable matching.
Case 1: M contains neither {ai, bi} nor (h(ai), {ai, bi}) for all i ∈ [k].
We claim that M is also contained in the reduced preferences after the elimination
of the generalized rotation. For the sake of contradiction, we assume that the mutual
acceptability of a hospital-residents pair that is part of M was deleted in the elimination
of the generalized rotation and show that this leads to a contradiction.
Assume that the mutual acceptability of a resident r and a hospital h with M(r) = h
was deleted. If h is a quota-one hospital, then the only residents that were deleted from
the preferences of h are residents r which appear together with h in a generalized rotation
pair, i.e., (h, r) = (ai, bi) or (r, h) = (ai, bi) for some i ∈ [k]. However, by our initial
assumption that M does not contain {ai, bi} for i ∈ [k], this implies that M(r) 6= h,
a contradiction. Thus h is a quota-two hospital. A resident r is only deleted from the
preferences of h if h = h(ai) and r = bi for some i ∈ [k]. As h(ai) is the top-choice of ai,
hospital h(ai) holds the proposal of ai. This implies by Lemma 5 that ai is ranked among
the two best residents in the preferences of h, and that M has either upper quota two
or exactly two residents on its preference list. As we have assumed that M(bi) = h(ai)
and (h(ai), {ai, bi}) /∈M , it needs to hold that M(h) = {bi, r
′} for some r′ 6= ai. As h(ai)
is the top-choice of ai and ai is among the two most preferred residents of h(ai), pair (h, ai)
blocks M , a contradiction.
Case 2: M contains {ai, bi} or (h(ai), {ai, bi}) for all i ∈ [k].
Construction of new matching. We claim that replacing {ai, bi} or (h(ai), {ai, bi})
by (g(ai), {ai, bi+1}) if ai and bi+1 are both residents, and {ai, bi+1} otherwise, results
in a stable matching M ′. Note that in the later case g(ai) is a quota-two hospital, as
otherwise bi+1 would be a hospital instead of a resident. Clearly, M
′ matches the same
set of residents and quota-one hospitals.
Feasibility. We first show that M ′ does not violate any quotas. First of all note that
by Observation 7 only ai and bi are matched to h(ai). Furthermore, all hospitals h(ai) are
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either closed or respect their lower quota: If h(ai) is flexible, then it is also open in M
′, as
in this case, g(ai) = h(ai) and (g(ai), {ai, bi+1}) ∈M
′. Otherwise h(ai) is inflexible, and
then it is closed in M ′ since by Lemma 7 bi 6= aj for all j ∈ [k], and thus, h(ai) 6= g(aj)
for all j ∈ [k]. Matching M ′ can only violate the upper quota of a hospital h that is also
open in M , as all replacements described above respect the upper quotas of all involved
hospitals.
Let h be a quota-one hospital which is matched to more than one resident in M ′. If h
does not occur in the generalized rotation, then h is matched to the same residents in M ′
as in M . If h occurs in the generalized rotation, i.e., h = ai or bi for some i ∈ [k], then h
is matched to resident bi or ai in M , while h is matched to bi+1 or ai−1 in M
′, obeying
the upper quota.
Let h be a quota-two hospital. The only quota-two hospitals to which we match
agents during the described replacements occur as g(ai) for some i ∈ [k]. For the sake of
contradiction, let us assume that h := g(ai) for some i ∈ [k] is open in M and violates its
upper quota in M ′.
If h = h(aj) for some j ∈ [k], then Observation 7 implies that h is matched to exactly
two residents in M and thereby also to exactly two residents in M ′. Otherwise it holds
that h 6= h(aj) for all j ∈ [k], which implies that either AB
+−3b(i) or AB+−3b(ii) applies
for ai. If AB
+−3b(i) applies, then h holds the proposal of bi+1 which implies by Lemma 5
that bi+1 is among the first two residents on the preference list of h. If AB
+−3b(ii) applies,
then by definition, bi+1 is one of the two most preferred residents on the preference list
of h. In both cases, it follows that h prefers bi+1 over one of the residents it is matched
to in M . Since h is on bi+1’s preference list, it follows that bi+1 prefers h over M , as we
have assumed that either {ai+1, bi+1} or (h(ai+1), {ai+1, bi+1}) is part of M which in both
cases implies that bi+1 is matched to its least preferred hospital in M . Thus, (h, bi+1)
forms a blocking pair in M , a contradiction. Therefore M ′ is a feasible matching.
Next we show that for any pair (r, h) ∈M ′ the acceptability of r and h has not been
deleted. Since ai 6= bj for all i, j ∈ [k] by Lemma 7, this can only occur if g(ai−1) =
h(ai). However, in this case, g(ai−1) received a proposal from ai, and thus, if g(ai−1) =
h(ai−1), then AB
+−2 implies ai = ai−1, while otherwise AB
+−3b(i) implies that bi = ai,
a contradiction.
It remains to show that M ′ is stable.
Stability. Any blocking pair or coalition for M ′ needs to obviously include an agent
that is matched differently in M ′ than in M , i.e., ai, bi, h(ai), or g(ai) for some i ∈ [k].
Claim 1: For all i ∈ [k], agent bi is matched differently in M
′ than in M and bi
prefers M ′ to M .
By the definition of BA−1 to BA−3, {ai, bi} ∈M or (h(ai), {ai, bi}) ∈M implies that
M(bi) is the last agent in the preferences of bi. Thus, it is enough to show that bi is
matched differently in M and M ′. If bi is a hospital, then M(bi) = ai and M
′(bi) = ai−1
are both residents, and ai 6= ai−1 implies that M(bi) 6=M
′(bi). If bi is a resident and ai is
a hospital, then again M(bi) =M
′(bi) implies ai = ai−1, a contradiction. If bi is a resident
and ai is also a resident, thenM(bi) = h(ai). IfM(bi) =M
′(bi) holds, then, sinceM(bi) is
a quota-two hospital, it holds thatM ′(bi) = g(ai−1). For the sake of contradiction, assume
that h(ai) = M(bi) = M
′(bi) = g(ai−1). Thus, ai issues a proposal to g(ai−1) = h(ai).
Since ai 6= ai−1 and every hospitals holds at most one proposal, this implies that resident
ai−1 cannot issue a proposal to g(ai−1) and thereby that h(ai−1) 6= g(ai−1) needs to hold.
It follows that AB+−3b(i) applies for ai−1, and thus, bi = ai, contradicting Lemma 7.
Claim 2: For all i ∈ [k], agent ai is neither part of a blocking pair nor in a blocking
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coalition in M ′.
If ai is a quota-one hospital, then BA−2 and AB
+−1 apply for bi and ai which implies
that ai is the last hospital on bi’s preferences and bi is the first resident and bi+1 is
the second resident on the preferences of ai. Thereby, ai is matched to its second-most
preferred resident in M ′. This implies that the only possible blocking pair including ai
in M ′ is (ai, bi). However, as by Claim 1, resident bi prefers M
′ to M , this cannot be a
blocking pair.
If ai is a resident, then ai can be either part of a blocking pair (ai, h) with some
hospital h ∈ H or part of a blocking coalition to open some hospital h ∈ H. If h(ai) is
flexible, then ai is matched to her first choice in M
′ and thus neither part of a blocking
coalition nor a blocking pair. Thus, we assume that h(ai) has quota one or is inflexible.
As ai is matched to her second-most preferred hospital g(ai) in M
′, the hospital in any
blocking coalition or pair containing ai is h := h(ai). We distinguish two cases based on
whether bi is a resident or a quota-one hospital.
If bi is a quota-one hospital, then BA−1 applies for bi, which implies that h(ai) = bi
and that ai is bi’s least preferred resident. However, as bi prefers M
′(bi) to ai as shown
in Claim 1, (h(ai), ai) cannot be a blocking pair for M
′.
If bi is a resident, then BA−3 needs to apply for bi and thereby h(ai) is a quota-two
hospital. Thus h(ai) is an inflexible hospital and has only two residents, namely ai and bi,
on its preference list. As ai cannot be matched to h(ai) in M
′, h(ai) is closed in M
′.
However, we have observed above that bi prefers M
′(bi) to M(bi) = h(ai) and thereby bi
is not part of a blocking coalition. Thus, no blocking coalition to open h(ai) exists, and ai
is neither part of a blocking pair nor a blocking coalition.
Claim 3: For all i ∈ [k] such that ai is a resident, hospital h(ai) is neither part of a
blocking pair nor a blocking coalition in M ′.
If h(ai) has lower quota one, then h(ai) = bi. Claim 1 implies that h(ai) prevers M
over M ′. Moreover, Claim 2 implies that all residents that prefer M over M ′ are not part
of a blocking pair or coalition. Thus, any blocking pair or coalition in M ′ involving h(ai)
also blocks M and thus, such blocking pairs and coalitions do not exist.
Thus h(ai) has lower quota two. Note that this implies that BA−3 applies for bi and
thereby that bi is a resident holding a proposal of h(ai) and by Lemma 5 that ai and bi
are the first two residents on the preferences of h(ai).
If h(ai) is an inflexible hospital, then h(ai) is closed in M
′, as by Claim 1, bi is not
matched to M(bi) = h(ai) in M
′. The only possible blocking coalition to open h(ai)
is (h, {ai, bi}). However, as bi prefers M
′(bi) to M(bi) = h(ai), resident bi cannot be part
of this coalition. Thus, h(ai) is contained neither in a blocking coalition nor a blocking
pair.
If h(ai) is a flexible hospital, then by Observation 6, h(ai) has upper quota two, bi+1
is a resident and ai, bi, and bi+1 are the first three residents in the preferences of h(ai).
Moreover, since AB+−2 applies for ai, it holds that h(ai) = g(ai). Thus, h(ai) is matched
to ai and bi in M and to ai and bi+1 in M
′. Consequently, the only possible blocking pair
involving h(ai) is (h(ai), bi). As by Claim 1, bi prefers M
′(h) to M(h) = h(ai), this pair
cannot be blocking.
Claim 4: For all i ∈ [k] such that ai is a resident, hospital g(ai) is neither part of a
blocking pair nor a blocking coalition in M ′.
Since g(ai) is open in M
′, it cannot be part of a blocking coalition. Assume that there
exists a blocking pair (r, g(ai)) in M
′. Note that it needs to hold that r 6= bi+1, as bi+1 is
matched to g(ai) in M
′.
If g(ai) is closed inM , then (g(ai), {bi+1, r}) is a blocking coalition inM : Resident bi+1
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prefers g(ai) over M(bi+1). Note that r 6= aj for all j ∈ [k] since by Claim 2 agents aj
are not part of a blocking coalition in M ′. If r = bi for some i ∈ [k], then r is matched
better in M ′ than in M , which implies that (g(ai), {bi+1, r}) blocks M . If r 6= ai, bi for
all i ∈ [k], then r is matched to the same hospital in M and M ′, which again implies that
(g(ai), {bi+1, r}) blocks M , a contradiction.
Therefore, g(ai) is open in M . Recall that we have proven in the first part of this
proof in the paragraph on feasibility that if a hospital g(ai) is open in M , then it needs
to hold that g(ai) = h(aj) for some j ∈ [k]. Thus, by Claim 3, g(ai) = h(aj) is not part
of a blocking coalition or pair, a contradiction.
Claim 5: For all i ∈ [k], agent bi cannot be part of a blocking pair or a blocking
coalition in M ′.
For all i ∈ [k], by Claim 2-4, we know that bi cannot form a blocking pair or coalition
with any agents appearing as aj , h(aj), or g(aj) for some j ∈ [k]. Thus, bi needs to form
a blocking pair or coalition only with agents that are matched to the same partners in M
and in M ′. However, as by Claim 1, bi prefers M
′(bi) to M(bi), this implies that the such
a blocking pair or coalition would also block M , a contradiction.
Before we prove that no stable matching is created by the elimination of a generalized
rotation, we identify a sufficient criterion for the non-existence of a stable matching, which
directly follows from Corollary 5 and Lemma 9
Corollary 6. If the preference list of a resident gets empty during Phase 2 or contains
only quota-two hospitals which have only one resident on their preferences, or the pref-
erence list of a quota-one hospital gets empty, then the instance does not admit a stable
matching.
Thus, we reject an instance as soon as the preference list of a resident or quota-
one hospital becomes empty by eliminating a rotation. This also implies that in the
following we can assume that the set of residents and quota-one hospitals with non-empty
preferences is the same before and after eliminating a rotation.
Lemma 10. Let Ibefore be the instance before the elimination of a generalized rotation
(but after applying Phase 1) and Iafter the instance after eliminating a generalized rotation
from Ibefore. Any stable matching M in Iafter which matches all residents with non-empty
preferences in Ibefore is also stable in Ibefore.
Proof. LetM be a stable matching in Iafter matching all residents with non-empty prefer-
ences in Ibefore. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume thatM is not stable in Ibefore.
Let C be a blocking coalition or blocking pair involving some hospital h for M in Ibefore.
The only possibility that C is not blocking in Iafter is that the mutual acceptibility of
h and some resident occurring in C has been deleted. We now make a case distinction
whether h is a quota-one or a quota-two hospital and argue for both cases that C cannot
block M in Ibefore.
Case 1: Hospital h is a quota-one hospital.
Let r be the resident such that h and r form together a blocking pair or coalition. For
the mutual acceptability of h and r to be deleted, it needs to hold that {h, r} = {ai, bi}
for some i ∈ [k].
Case 1.1: ai = h and bi = r (BA−2 applies for bi).
In this case, ai is the last hospital on the preference list of bi, which implies that bi
prefers all hospitals remaining on its preference list over h. Thus, bi prefers M(bi) over h,
a contradiction.
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Case 1.2: ai = r and bi = h (BA−1 applies for bi).
In this case, hospital bi prefers all residents on its preference list over ai.
If bi is unmatched in M , then we claim that ai−1 prefers bi over M(ai−1): The pref-
erence of resident ai−1 start with a quota-one or inflexible hospital h(ai−1), followed
by g(ai−1) = bi, as AB
+−3a has to apply for ai−1. Furthermore, ai−1 is not matched
to h(ai−1) in M because either h(ai−1) is inflexible, implying that h(ai−1) has lower
quota two but only ai−1 on its preferences in I
after, or h(ai−1) has lower quota one and
the mutual acceptability of ai−1 and h(ai−1) = bi−1 has been deleted by the elimination of
the generalized rotation. Thus, (ai−1, bi) is a blocking pair forM in I
after, a contradiction
to the stability of M .
Thus, bi is matched in M and therefore prefers resident M(bi) over resident ai, a
contradiction to (ai, bi) being a blocking pair for M .
Case 2: Hospital h is a quota-two hospital.
Then, it either holds that C = (h, r1) is a blocking pair or C = (h, {r1, r2}) is a
blocking coalition for two residents r1, r2 ∈ R. Assume without loss of generality that the
acceptability of r1 and h has been deleted. This implies that h = h(ai) and r1 = bi for
some i ∈ [k]. Note that r1 prefers all hospitals on her preference list to h. As h(ai) is
contained in the preferences of r1, the preferences of r1 are non-empty and thus, by our
assumption on M , resident r1 is matched in M . This implies that r1 does not prefer h
over her partner in M , a contradiction.
4.2.4 Proof of Theorem 4
We are now ready to prove that the full algorithm works correctly.
Theorem 4. If the lower quota of each hospital is at most two, then HR-QU
L
(and thereby
also HR-QL) is solvable in O(n
3m) time.
Proof. As we have proven in Lemma 6 that a generalized rotation always exists unless the
preferences of all residents have length at most one and as by eliminating a generalized
rotation, the preference list of at least one resident gets shorter, the described algorithm is
guaranteed to terminate. More specifically, each application of Phase 1a or 2 removes the
mutual acceptability of at least one resident and at least one hospital, while each execution
of Phase 1b reduces the number of quota-two hospitals. Since we may assume that each
hospital has upper quota at most n, it follows that there are at most O(mn) hospitals at
any stage of the algorithm. Thus, it follows that there are at most O(n ·mn) = O(n2m)
mutual acceptabilities at any stage of the algorithm, and all executions of Phase 1b
together can be performed in O(n2m). Since all except the first proposal an agent receives
results in a rejection and reduces the number of mutual acceptabilities, it follows that all
executions of Phase 1a can be performed in O(n2m) time. A generalized rotation can
be found in O(min{n,#hospitals}) by Lemma 6, where #hospitals denotes the number
of hospitals present in the instance when searching for a rotation. Since the number of
residents does not change (while the number of hospitals might increase up to O(nm)),
it follows that a rotation can be found in O(n). Thus, all executions of Phase 2 can be
executed in O(n · n2m) time. Thus, the runtime O(n3m) follows.
If the algorithm returns a matching M , then M matches all agents from S. Thus, the
preferences of a resident can get empty only in the first application of Phase 1a, which
implies that the set of residents with empty preferences is the same before eliminating the
first generalized rotation and after eliminating the last generalized rotation. Consequently,
Lemmas 3, 4 and 10 imply that M is also stable in the input instance.
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If the input instance contains a stable matching M∗, then Corollary 5 implies thatM∗
matches all agents from S. Consequently, Corollary 4 and Lemmas 4 and 9 ensure that
there also exists a stable matching covering S in the instance created by the algorithm,
i.e., the algorithm returns a matching M . This matching is stable as argued above, and
the correctness of the algorithm follows.
5 Conclusion
We conducted a thorough parameterized complexity analysis of the Hospital Residents
problem with lower and upper quotas. We have shown that the hardness of this problem
arises from choosing the set of open hospitals such that no blocking coalition exists, as
the problem remains hard even if all hospitals have only lower quotas and pairs cannot
block an outcome, but it becomes easy as soon as the set of open hospitals is given. We
have also analyzed two variants of this problem.
One direction for future work is to analyze what happens if the preferences may
contain ties. Using the ILP approach from Proposition 2, parameterized by the number of
hospitals, HR-QL and HA-Q
U
L
should remain fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by
the number of hospitals, while for HR-QU
L
the situation is unclear. Notably, in this setting,
HR-QU
L
subsumes the two other models. Moreover, it would be also interesting to analyze
other stable many-to-one matching problems using a similar fine-grained parameterized
approach as taken in this paper to enrich our understanding of the complexity of these
problems. Finally, our polynomial-time algorithm for lower quota two might be adaptable
to also work for other problems such as special variants of the three-dimensional Stable
Roommates problem.
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